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The Order of St John, Geopolitics, and the Growth of Western Capitalism1 
The Order of St John was originally founded as a hospice-keeping institution in eleventh-century Syria. 
By the following century it metamorphosed into a Christian military unit to adjust to geopolitical 
evolutions which saw the Holy Land transformed into a frontier territory where Muslims and Christians 
clashed bracing the mantra of religious ideology. Keeping hospices and fighting Islam increased the 
financial demands on the Order, and consequently the reliance on its continental estates which the 
knights hospitallers systematically acquired throughout the first few centuries of their existence. 
The accumulation of these European estates through bequests, donations, or direct purchase2 
was a long-term investment with irreversible implications for the Hospitaller Order of St John. If well 
managed, extensive land possession in the agrocentric societies of pre-industrial Europe meant wealth 
in abundance and long-term prosperity which hardly any other economic activity could guarantee. 
Woods became timber, orchards provided fruit, and vineyards wine, fields yielded grain cargoes and all 
kinds of other crops, and farms reared livestock which provided meat, milk, cheese, wool, hides, and 
multiplied into other livestock, all of which could be consumed or used directly, bartered, or monetized. 
By the dawn of the early modern age, the Order had long upstaged its income-generation potential by 
diversifying the systematic exploitation of its estates. These estates, termed commanderies, and their 
various members dispersed throughout European territory could be sold or leased out, in full or in part, 
on short or long lets. Over the centuries the Order re-organised its continental property, grouping the 
commanderies into a series of priories, as Hospitaller edifices ended up merged into an ever-expanding 
continental urban fabric while long-term population levels soared and the urbanization process gained 
pace. The Order’s architectural spaces within and outside urban walls were divided into grounds, rooms, 
apartments, houses, and workshops which could be sold or rented out.3 More income was derived from 
occasional gifts, exceptional impositions on these continental estates, fees for the admission of new 
members to the Order, and portions of inheritance of deceased Knights which by statute were due to 
                                                     
1 This study – with a few adjustments - is drawn from my doctoral dissertation. Ivan Grech, ‘Hospitaller Malta’s 
Communication System with the Mediterranean World in the Early Seventeenth Century’, unpublished PhD 
dissertation, Department of History, University of Malta, 2016. 
2 For a general overview of how the Order of St John of Jerusalem accumulated these estates in the first centuries 
of its existence, and how these estates were exploited to improve the economic condition of the Hospital see H.J.A. 
Sire The Knights of Malta (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1996), especially chapter eight; 
Dominic Selwood, Knights of the Cloister. Templars and Hospitallers in Central-Southern Occitania 1100-1300 
(Woodbridge, The Boydell Press, 1999); Judith Bronstein, The Hospitallers and the Holy Land, Financing of the 
Latin East 1187-1274 (Woodbridge, The Boydell Press, 2005). 
3 For an example of the development of a Hospitaller commandery in an urban setting and its exploitation for the 
generation of income, see Cesare Cattaneo Mallone di Novi, Gli Hospitalieri di San Giovanni a Genova. Sette 
chiese, tre ospedali, due commende, un collegio (Genoa, Delegazione Granpriorale di Genova, 1994) and Ivan 
Grech, ‘The Hospitaller Commandery of San Giovanni di Prè in Genoa. Aspects of its Historical Development in 
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, unpublished M.A. dissertation, Department of History, University of 
Malta, 1996. 
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the common crusading cause.4 It was up to the receivers and procurators stationed in Europe to collect 
and manage the overall resulting funds from the various ricette – Hospitaller financial jurisdictions 
dispersed throughout the continent which served as depositories of the Order’s revenue. Profits from 
Hospitaller trading, privateering, and pillaging activities provided further introits for the Common 
Treasury of the Order.5 A large cargo of soap confiscated in the Levant, for example, could fetch a 
handsome price on the Roman market6 and from time to time foreign governments sounded the Order 
to sell them slaves,7 a commodity in perennial demand in a Mediterranean arena where fighting, rowing, 
and the ensuing casualties ensured that the manpower-supply trade was rarely inactive.8 
 But the generation of income through land, stone, inheritance, donations, trade, and crime was 
not always sufficient to sustain an institution like the Order of Saint John, whose self-imposed charitable 
ethos and much more financially taxing anti-Muslim militant creed9 implied enduring social, economic, 
and military engagement on regional and continental levels spanning centuries. As consistent frontliners 
on the Mediterranean’s ideological barricade and compulsive hoarders of landed property,10 the 
Hospitallers took upon themselves commitments which rendered compulsory and inevitable their 
introduction into a Euro-Mediterranean economy which, as the early modern age unfolded, was 
becoming increasingly reliant on capital11 and on financial transactions for the relocation of funds. 
These financial transactions ultimately became a distinctive feature of western early modernity, 
bringing about changes in the credit markets which collectively earned the historiographical tag of 
‘financial revolution’.12 
 Scholarship on the Order of St John hitherto still lacks a thorough, authoritative, and 
comprehensive study on the financial dealings of the Hospitallers throughout their history. Judith 
Bronstein’s study analyses the Order of St John’s economic efforts in the West and Latin Syria to help 
finance Hospitaller crusading missions in the Holy Land in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries.13 
Bronstein shows how the Order received land and towns as donations, bought and sold property, 
invested in animal husbandry, cleared forests to gain agricultural land, traded in land and animal 
                                                     
4 The spoglio was four-fifths of a Knight’s property which passed on to the Order after his death. The mortuary 
consisted of the fruits of a commandery from the day the commander died till the start of the next financial year. 
The vacancy consisted in the fruits of the commandery accumulated in the following financial year. For a generic 
overview of the Order of St John’s sources of income and the definition of related terminology, see Alison 
Hoppen, The Fortification of Malta by the Order of St. John. 1530-1798 (Edinburgh, 1979), 140-55. 
5 T. M. Vann, ‘The Fifteenth-Century Maritime Operations of the Knights of Rhodes’, in The Military Orders Vol 
4. On Land and by Sea, Judi Upton-Ward (ed.) Ashgate, 2008, 217. 
6 AOM 1399, Wignacourt to Valdina (Palermo), ff. 285v-286, 12 July 1620. 
7 AOM 1417, Lascaris Castellar to Gio Andrea Doria (Viceroy of Sardinia), f. 80v, 9 April 1638. 
8 Ivan Grech, ‘Dealing with Manpower Shortages in the Mediterranean. The Hospitaller Order of St John’s Labour 
Force Problems during the ‘Long Seventeenth Cenutry’’, in C. Vassallo and S. Mercieca (eds.), The Port of Malta 
(Malta, 2018), 75-96. 
9 Hoppen (1979), 144. 
10 For an account of the Order’s acquisition and occasional loss of European estates from the Middle Ages to 
modern times, and a pictorial representation of their continental location, see Sire (1996), passim.  
11 Braudel reassures us that it is not anachronistic to use the terms ‘capital’ and ‘capitalism’ in a pre-industrial 
context, and William N. Parker asserts that certain ‘economic elements’, of the medieval world are recognizable 
as ‘capitalist’. Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century. Vol 1: The Wheels of Commerce. 
Trans. S. Reynolds (London, Fontana Press, 1985), chapter 3, and William N. Parker, Europe, America and the 
Wider World Essays on the Economic History of Western Capitalism. Vol 1: Europe and the World Economy 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984), 3 respectively. Not all opinions in contemporary historiography 
converge on the issue. A different school of thought is less prone to condone the use of such terminology within 
a pre-industrial context. See, for example, John Chircop, ‘From Permeable Frontiers to Strict Border Divisions: 
The Geostrategic Construction of the Mediterranean on the Ruins of the Ancient Narrow Seas’, in Borders and 
Conflicts in the Mediterranean Basin, G. D’Angelo and J. Martins Ribeiro (eds.) MK, Turin 2016, 50-68.   
12 For a brief overview of the benefits to international trade as a result of sixteenth-century financial innovations 
see, for example, John H. Munro, ‘The Low Countries’ Export Trade in Textiles with the Mediterranean Basin, 
1200-1600: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Comparative Advantages in Overland and Maritime Trade Routes’,  
International Journal of Maritime History, vol. xi, no 2 (1999), 27-8. 
13 Bronstein, passim. 
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produce, and lent money in a drive to expand its economic activity, both in Latin Syria and Europe, 
especially France, in order to finance its fighting in the Levant and withstand the dual Mamluk and 
Mongol menace from different latitudes.14 Glimpses on the economic activities, and consequently on 
the monetary transactions of the Order for the fourteenth century can be found in the writings of 
Anthony Luttrell, who acknowledges the documentary lacunae in this field, yet manages to provide a 
picture of a financially enterprising Order which by the beginning of the 1300s was quite well-versed 
in monetary transaction mechanisms, acting as both lender and borrower to supplement its income.15 
 The financial strains of the confrontation with Islam in the eastern Mediterranean were too 
pronounced to be sufficiently and readily eased by the sole reliance on the European estates, whose 
capacity to generate and transfer cash was often too sluggish or downright insufficient for the pressing 
needs of war. To conquer Rhodes in 1310, the Order had to take hefty loans from the Papacy and its 
Florentine banking families. The Bardi, the Peruzzi, the Acciaiuoli, and the Alberti continued to credit 
the Order demanding a minimum interest of 6 per cent and the pledging of Hospitaller estates in Europe 
as repayment guarantees,16 a basic fund-raising mechanism, similar to that adopted by the merchants of 
Antwerp in the sixteenth century,17 which the Order exploited since its years in Latin Syria18 and 
continued to exploit right up to its last days in Malta in the eighteenth century, when widespread post-
Revolutionary turmoil and the consequent confiscation of several of its estates in Europe castrated its 
creditworthiness.19 Further borrowing was contracted from bankers of Pistoia for the defence of Rhodes 
in the second half of the 1300s20 and although repayment commitments could waist all the income of 
several priories,21 the Order was still sufficiently resourceful to become a creditor itself, lending sums 
to royalty22 and to its former Florentine creditors, apparently suffering losses when the Acciaiuoli and 
the Peruzzi went bankrupt towards the mid-fourteenth century.23 Similar setbacks were physiological 
hiccups in an otherwise enduring history of monetary investments which saw the Hospitallers venture 
more insistently into the world of finance as their history unfolded, perhaps less conspicuously and 
spectacularly than the Templars,24 whose wealth and banking prowess attracted French monarchic greed 
with fatal consequences, but with more lasting dividends which contributed to the Order’s survival and 
military activism for several centuries. Documentary focus on early-modern Italy alone reveals that the 
Hospitallers made investments of varying proportions from north to south of the peninsula. Manuscript 
sources mention Hospitaller investments in the Banco di Lampugnano in 160725 and refer to a 7 per 
cent investment in the territories of Milan and Cremona in 1609;26 the Order and members of its property 
                                                     
14 Ibid. 
15 Anthony T. Luttrell, ‘Actividades economicas de los Hospitalarios de Rodas en el Mediterraneo  occidental 
durante el siglo XIV’, in VI Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragón: 8-14 December 1957 (Madrid, 1959), 
175-83.  
16 Anthony T. Luttrell, ‘Interessi fiorentini nell’economia e nella politica dei Cavalieri ospedalieri di Rodi nel 
Trecento’, Annali della Scuola Superiore di Pisa (Pisa, Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, 1959), 317-8. 
17 Braudel (1985), 251. 
18 Bronstein, 48. The Order continued to pledge its property to contract and cover loans even during its island 
phase in the East. Luttrell, ‘Interessi fiorentini’ (1959), 318. 
19 Ivan Grech, ‘La confisca dei beni dell’Ordine di Malta da parte della Repubblica Ligure’, in Cavalieri di San 
Giovanni e Territorio. La Liguria tra Provenza e Lombardia nei Secoli XIII-XVII. Atti del Convegno Genova-
Imperia-Cervo, 11-14 settembre 1997, J. Costa Restagno (ed.) Istituto Internazionale di StudiLiguri, Genoa 1999, 
207-17. 
20 Luttrell, ‘Actividades economicas’ (1959), 180. 
21 Luttrell, ‘Interessi fiorentini’ (1959), 318-9. 
22 Luttrell, ‘Actividades economicas’ (1959), 179. 
23 Luttrell, ‘Interessi fiorentini’ (1959), 318-20. 
24 For an account of the persecution of the Templars by Philip IV of France in the fourteenth century, see Malcolm 
Barber, The Trial of the Templars (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996). In the Middle Ages, France 
and England used the banking services of the Templars ‘with great sophistication’. I. De la Torre, ‘The London 
and Paris Temples: A Comparative Analysis of Their Financial Services for the King during the Thirteenth 
Century’, in The Military Orders Vol 4. On Land and by Sea, Judi Upton-Ward (ed.) Ashgate, 2008, 121-7. 
25 AOM 1386, Wignacourt to La Marra (Palermo), ff. 55-56, 11 February 1607. 
26 AOM 1388, Wignacourt to Amb. Lomellino (Rome), ff. 143v-145r, 30 April 1609. 
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in Liguria held a number of luoghi in the Genoese bank of San Giorgio27 and at one point in the mid-
seventeenth century the Order was willing to cash in on other assets in the form of luoghi di monte held 
in Rome.28 
 Naples was apparently another favourite market for the Hospitallers to invest their money in. 
Income from the sale of property was converted in assets which yielded an interest29 and thousands of 
ducats could be deposited in the Monte della Pietà of the city.30 When in 1636 the Viceroy of Naples 
wanted to punish the knights hospitallers after their galleys confiscated a grain-laden Flemish vessel 
which had left Barletta to replenish other Spanish outposts, he found nothing better than to freeze the 
Hospitaller assets held in the various banks of his kingdom.31 Although the above are scant references 
which deserve deeper and more quantitative attention, they are indicative of a Hospitaller Order eager 
to exploit the possibilities offered by financial investment, more so in Italy, a country which had 
distinguished itself as a pioneer in the emergence of early modern western capitalism.32 
 This capacity of the Order of St John to generate funds, irrespective of the source, was often an 
answer to short-term administrative and survival priorities but one which, protracted over decades and 
centuries, placed the institution and the island-bases it governed, such as early modern Malta, on a par 
with other continental states in terms of availability and accessibility of resources to finance their 
military infrastructure and activism. According to world historian Paul Kennedy, in early modernity the 
geopolitical fragmentation of Europe, even with Habsburg power at its zenith, created a spiral of 
strategic rivalry between the powers of Christendom which encouraged a rudimentary arms race for the 
resolution of conflicts, particularly from the early 1500s when the ‘military revolution’ started gaining 
further momentum.33 Unlike other powers like Ming China or Mogul India, Europe was a divided 
continent where inter-state antagonism was augmented by confessional strife after the Protestant 
schism, and where Spanish Habsburg might was enough to intimidate the other states but not to impose 
absolute hegemony, stimulating a bellicose competition which remoulded state administrations and 
elicited the multiplication of efforts to generate and exploit resources, financial and otherwise.34 Other 
historians shift the main focus on the resources available to European states in early modernity. Azar 
Gat, for example, argues that the ever increasing war expenses incurred by these states throughout early 
modernity was consequential to the capacity of these same states to draw on their resources and improve 
their military competitive edge in a fragmented continent.35 Gat’s argument is in part corroborated by 
Niall Ferguson, who simplifies the argument further and straightforwardly equates the faculty to fight 
                                                     
27 Ivan Grech (1996), 101-6. A luogo, from the Latin locum, was a quota of the Genoese public debt placed on the 
market with a nominal value of 100 lire. The luoghi generated an annual interest but their value varied constantly 
and were used as a means of payment in financial transactions, with the result that the lira de luoghi came to 
constitute another currency on the Genoese market. Jacques Heers, Genova nel ’400. Civiltà mediterranea, grande 
capitalismo e capitalismo popolare. Trans. P. Mastrosa (Milan, Jaca Book, 1991), 85 and 106. For an example of 
Hospitaller profit made from an investment in the Bank of San Giorgio, see AOM 663, f. 4v, 12 February 1605. 
28 AOM 259, f. 38, 20 August 1652. 
29 Income from the sale of two houses in Naples was to be placed ‘in alcun luogo sicuro per cavarne quelli frutti 
annuali che si sogliono dare’. AOM 1388, Wignacourt to Caraffa (Naples), f. 189v, 13 June 1609. In 1613, with 
reference to Naples, Alof de Wignacourt speaks of the ‘molte rendite che sono in cotesto Regno’. AOM 1392, 
Wignacourt to Abenante (Naples), ff. 161-162, 1 April 1613. 
30 In 1618, the Order deposited 15,000 ducats in the Monte della Pietà of Naples. AOM 1397, Wignacourt to 
Ponte (Naples), f. 144v, 21 April 1618. 
31 Bartholomeo Dal Pozzo, Historia della S. Religione Militare di S. Giovanni Gerosolimitano detta di Malta, 2 
vols. (Verona, 1703 and Venice 1715), i, 841. 
32 On the rise of Italy to financial prominence in western society, see Giuseppe Felloni, ‘Dall’Italia all’Europa: il 
primato della finanza italiana dal Medioevo alla prima età moderna’, in Storia d’Italia. Annali 23. La Banca, A. 
Cova, S. La Francesca, A. Moioli and C. Bermond (eds.) Giulio Einaudi Editore, Turin 2008, 93-149. 
33 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 
2000 (London, Fontana Press 1989), ‘Introduction’. 
34 Kennedy, the ‘Introduction’ and the first three chapters. 
35 Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), 449-511. 
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with money,36 while Geoffrey Parker states how the whole saga of the Dutch revolt was heavily 
conditioned by Spain’s recurrent financial crises.37 
 One can argue whether Hospitaller Malta, and particularly the Order of St John, can be encased 
in Gat’s paradigm. The Order’s military arena during its island-phase was largely restricted to the 
Mediterranean and its liminal contours,38 with Islam, and the Ottoman Empire in particular, as its main 
adversary.39 On the continent, the Order’s prime bellicose interest was substantially a passive one. The 
Knights lacked military adversaries in Christendom, yet could do little to impede the exploitation and 
plunder of their European estates by continental troops except from lodging diplomatic utterances in 
the hope that other potentates intervened in their stead to implement remedies which the Order, a 
flyweight in a Europe of domineering nation and territorial states, was impotent to enforce.40 
 However, despite its status as a substantial passive observer and occasional victim of 
continental military competition, the Order had to fight its own lesser or official wars in the 
Mediterranean, and whether as an assailant, besieger, supplier of troops and galleys, or besieged 
defender, it was nonetheless compelled to maximise its military potential in order to survive and inflict 
as much damage as possible on Islam. Throughout its gradual displacement west after its foundation in 
Syria, the Order had to review and upgrade its military machine and approach to warfare. It ventured in 
maritime warfare with the building and upkeep of a galley squadron and, like so many other powers, 
had to update its military infrastructural designs to adapt to changes imposed by the gunpowder 
revolution.41 The Order sought further improvements throughout its stay in Malta and kept an eye open 
for possible technological improvements which could provide it with a military edge. In 1603, the 
Hospitaller hierarchy was mulling the acquisition of a supposedly new secret formula for making 
saltpetre,42 and by the mid-seventeenth century it added another galley to its squadron.43 
 Whatever the causation of the Order’s destiny – the military mission demanded resources yet, 
irrespective of the demand, no mission would have been possible without sufficient availability of 
resources and the capacity to source them in the first place -  Hospitaller efforts to sustain their militancy 
and provide for the bases and populations they governed would not have been possible without the 
availability of sufficient capital. Although the Order was not competing in the European arena, it was 
nonetheless a Catholic force fully enveloped in Mediterranean warfare and its history can be annexed 
to Gat’s argument regarding the conditioning factor of the availability of resources. The monies 
generated in Europe by the commanderies, raiding, capital investment, and otherwise rendered 
Hospitaller militancy on Christendom’s side feasible for practically 700 years, moulding the Order of 
St John’s history, giving it an imprint and direction which otherwise would not have been possible. 
While the income from donations and privateering booty was largely fortuitous, although occasionally 
spectacular, that from European estates and investments was more structural and dependable, albeit 
subject to multiple contingencies. These resources allowed the Hospitallers to become fortification and 
galley builders for centuries on end, making it possible for them to survive and recover from crushing 
                                                     
36 ‘fighting is possible only if you can raise the money to pay for it’. Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money. A 
Financial History of the World (London, Penguin Books, 2009), 70. 
37 Geoffrey Parker, The Dutch Revolt (London, Penguin Books, 1990), 16. 
38 Small contingents of Knights sent to aid anti-Turkish Imperial campaigns on Christendom’s eastern front, such 
as in 1739, were sporadic instances of Hospitaller continental military engagement which cannot be deemed as 
full-scale military involvement on European territory by the Order. AOM 1498 Despuig to Amb. Baglio de Schade 
(Rome), ff. 51v-52, 2 March 1739. 
39 This argument is also reproduced in Grech, ‘Dealing with Manpower Shortages in the Mediterranean’ (2018), 
83-4. 
40 Ivan Grech, ‘The Dread of Violence and the Lure of Conflict. Contrasting Attitudes to Warfare: the Case of the 
Hospitaller Order of St John’, in Historicizing Religion. Critical Approaches to Contemporary Concerns, B. 
Borstner, S. Gartner, S. Deschler-Erb, C. Dalli, and I-M. D’Aprile (eds.) Pisa University Press, Pisa 2010, 145-
57. 
41 Ibid., 146-50.   
42 AOM 1382, Wignacourt to Malvicino (Venice), f. 164v, 19 May 1603. 
43 Grech, ‘Dealing with Manpower Shortages in the Mediterranean’ (2018), 83. 
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defeats, relocate their efforts, lick their wounds, and come back for more.44 Just as Ottoman resilience 
was largely due to the Anatolian hinterland’s backup, as manifested by the remarkable post-Lepanto 
recovery,45 the Order of St John’s centenary stamina was sustained by its European estates. The analogy, 
however improbable due to the immeasurable dimensional gap between the two antagonists, can be 
considered plausible. More so, the income from these estates allowed the Hospitallers to participate in 
aggressive naval warfare with an efficiency and compulsive indulgence which rendered the Order a 
model for the smaller Catholic powers of the Mediterranean with proselytising effects. In the sixteenth 
century, the foundation of the Tuscan Order of St Stephen and its galley fleet was inspired and modelled 
on that of the Hospitaller Order of St John.46 
 The overall result of the Knights’ resources and military involvement was that the Order of St 
John, and eventually Malta, became perhaps Spain’s most faithful ally in the Mediterranean. Hospitaller 
Malta was one of the few Catholic forces on which the Habsburgs could rely on almost unfailingly 
when demanded by anti-Muslim duty, with relatively few collateral demands and implications which 
rarely went beyond the annual concessions of the duty-free export of grain from Spanish Mediterranean 
outposts. The eleventh-hour soccorso of September 1565, one-off monetary donations such as aid for 
the post-siege construction of a new city-fortress,47 and sporadic ambassadorial plights in times of dire 
food shortages48 were instances of exceptional Habsburg attention elicited by early modern Malta in an 
otherwise centenary history of loyal peripherality. Hospitaller Malta was comparatively of little weight 
to the Spanish crown and the benefits of the island stronghold for the Habsburg cause did not stop there. 
Malta was a Spanish fief conceded to the Order of St John as part of the Kingdom of Sicily and did not 
feel threatened by Habsburg might. It was free from the Spanish threat which conditioned other 
European and Catholic states. If anything, Habsburg presence in Sicily provided added reassurance for 
the islanders, at least on a perceptive if not effective level. In turn, Malta’s size and peripheral status to 
the Habsburg world could be of no significant nuisance to Spain. Malta was not locked in the continental 
logistical quagmire which was partly responsible for the decades of European internecine warfare 
throughout early modernity, and was neither burdened by internal confessional schisms. It was perhaps 
the most fundamental of Catholic forces, for its sole military obsession was Islam and was mentally and 
logistically free to pursue its mission with a single-mindedness which hardly any Catholic force in early 
modernity could afford. Malta was Spain’s loyal sentinel in the middle of the Mediterranean which 
guarded its own limited confines while keeping an eye open on Habsburg shores in southern Italy,49 a 
dependable cluster of rocks with the added bonus of units of Hospitaller property scattered throughout 
Europe which consistently funded its subsistence and militancy. To make these funds available to its 
needs, the Order had to relocate them from Europe to its headquarters or wherever they were needed, 
and to do so it had to rely on its communication and financial network sprawled all over the continent,50 
a web of contacts consisting of receivers, procurators, secretaries, and agents in general, plus a host of 
merchants, financiers, and money-changers.  
 
                                                     
44 This statement is clearly stated in my doctoral dissertation. Grech (2016), chapter 5. 
45 Molly Greene, ‘Resurgent Islam: 1500-1700’, in The Mediterranean in History, D. Abulafia (ed.) Thames and 
Hudson, London 2003, 225-6. 
46 Ann Williams, ‘Island Ports and Hospitallers, 1421-1631’, in Islands and Military Orders, c.1291-c.1798, E. 
Buttiġieġ and S. Phillips (eds.) Ashgate, 2013, 73. Luca Lo Basso, Uomini da remo. Galee e galeotti del 
Mediterraneo in età moderna (Milan, Selene Edizioni, 2003), 342-3. 
47 Brian Blouet, The Story of Malta (Malta, Progress Press, 1989), 107. 
48 Dal Pozzo, i and ii, passim. 
49 On Hospitaller Malta’s forwarding of military intelligence to Christendom, see Ivan Grech, ‘Getting to Know 
the Enemy: Hospitaller Malta’s Intelligence Network in the Early Seventeenth Century’, in Turkish Historical 
Review 9/2, Leiden 2018, 105-50. 
50 For Hospitaller Malta’s communication system and network, see Grech (2016), passim. 
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From Latin Syria to Malta: Continuity and Change in Hospitaller Fund Transfer 
Networking and Institutional Coercion: The Surveillance of Hospitaller Personnel 
The mobilization of funds was an exercise fraught with difficulties in pre-industrial Europe. Time, 
distance, the elements, the search for the right financiers or reliable merchants who could clear bills of 
exchange, the expenses and risks involved in the transportation of cash over land and sea, or the payment 
of interest charged on relocated sums when cashed in one place to be reimbursed in another were all 
factors which had to be dealt with when sourcing and transferring money. For the Order of St John there 
was the added difficulty of spending a good part of its existence on islands. One inherent weakness in 
Hospitaller administration, in fact, was that the commanderies, the Order’s lifeblood, were scattered 
throughout all latitudes of Christendom. This provided welcome alternatives when income from some 
property dried out for some reason or another, yet created several difficulties at an administrative level. 
Controlling and defending Hospitaller estates, while sustaining a regular contact with them for all sorts 
of activities, not least the sourcing of funds, was an arduous task for the Hospitaller hierarchy. In a way, 
the Order had similar problems to Habsburg Spain in collecting money from a fragmented mass of 
possessions, with the added handicap that it was not endowed with Spanish muscle and influence to 
impose its interests and policy when problems arose. What arguments or means were available for the 
Hospitallers to stave off the confiscation of all its estates in England or to curb the freezing of its banking 
assets in the Kingdom of Naples mentioned earlier?  
 Distance was obviously a massive hurdle, even to impose internal administrative discipline. 
Whether in Syria, Cyprus, Rhodes, or Malta, the Hospitaller Convent (the Order’s headquarters) was 
an absent landlord vis-à-vis its European estates, with all the ensuing difficulties in personnel 
supervision that this implied, just as it was practically impossible for the Dutch directors in Amsterdam 
to keep strict control on the running of their VOC (United East India Company) activities overseas.51 
In the 1300s, payments to Rhodes from the German priories started defaulting52 and by the following 
century the Order was finding it difficult to collect responsions from Hungary53 and practically 
impossible from  Scandinavia.54 The Order was plagued by similar problems throughout its existence 
and was perfectly aware of the difficulty to enforce its Council’s decisions on its personnel, and 
consequently of the importance of the goodwill and professionalism of its agents for the smooth running 
of its affairs.55 The Order could not afford to lower its guard, for the repercussions of poor or fraudulent 
administration on the continent reverberated right down to the Hospitaller headquarters and came to 
bear on the Common Treasury.  
 The efficiency of the surveillance of personnel was often directly proportional to vicinity and 
reach. While in Malta, it was comparatively easy for the Order’s headquarters to keep a closer eye on 
agents in nearby Sicily, potentially reachable through a day’s sailing and a maximum of two days horse 
travel from Scicli to the island’s opposite coastal extremities.56 But the more distant from Hospitaller 
Malta was the agent, the more complicated it was to execute regular and effective vigilance. Months 
could pass by, for example, without receiving any form of writing from southern Germany.57 Europe’s 
heartland could seem a very remote place from a Mediterranean island context. Continental perceptions 
                                                     
51 David S., Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (London, Abacus, 1998), 141-9. 
52 Sire (1996), 195. 
53 H.J.A. Sire, ‘The Priory of Vrana: The Order of St John in Croatia’, in The Military Orders. Vol 4. On Land 
and by Sea, J. Upton-Ward (ed.) Ashgate, 2008, 226. 
54 Sire (1996), 197. 
55 Alof de Wignacourt could not put it more clearly in a letter to Rome in the early months of his magistracy: 
‘conoscendo che i buoni ordini operano molto poco se non sono aiutati dalla dilig[enz]a e sollecitudine de i 
Ministri…’. AOM 1381, Wignacourt to Amb. Porras (Rome), f. 34, 5 January 1602. 
56 A horse courier, for example, could cover the Scicli-Messina crossing in a maximum of one and a half days, 
and the distance between Scicli and Palermo could be covered in a maximum of two days. See, respectively: AOM 
1385, Wignacourt to Falco (Scicli), f. 312v, 11 September 1606; AOM 1384, Wigncourt to Falco (Scicli), f. 329, 
3 October 1605; and AOM 1389, Wignacourt to Grimaldi (Scicli), f. 204v, 21 July 1610. 
57 In January 1615, Wignacourt complained that six months had gone by without receiving official letters from 
southern Germany. AOM 1394, Wignacourt to Rosabac (High Germany), f. 63, 20 January 1615.  
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from the Convent could be hazy and at times the Hospitaller hierarchy could even encounter problems 
locating and properly picturing some of its own lands in Europe, at least up to the early seventeenth 
century. In 1602, the Convent was trying to establish whether the Principality of Tyrol fell within the 
Hospitaller Priory of Germany or that of Bohemia, and the doubts apparently persisted for years.58 In 
1615, despite extensive research in the archives of the Italian and German Langues, the Order still could 
not figure which priories comprised the territory of Tyrol (a region across the Austrian-Italian Alps) 
and the receiver in Venice had to be commissioned to try and solve the dilemma.59 Similar problems 
render the idea of how complicated it could be for a group of Knights stranded on a rock in the middle 
of the Mediterranean to access, keep contact with, and consequently exert some form of control over 
very distant possessions.  
 One way for the Order to verify its state of financial affairs on the continent was to oblige its 
receivers and procurators to send reports on the accounts of their respective ricette as regularly as 
possible. This provided the Common Treasury in Malta with knowledge on the funds available for the 
execution of the various transactions needed by the Order and its archipelago base.60 The prevailing 
impression in early modern Hospitaller historiography has hitherto been that the Order’s administration 
lacked consistency and regularity in its record-keeping regarding financial transactions, fund transfers, 
and the income and expenditure from its priories.61 Should we review our convictions on this matter? 
A close analysis of the magistral outgoing correspondence for the first half of the seventeenth century 
alone would suggest that the Order solicited accounts from its financial agents on a fairly regular basis, 
although not always obtaining the desired results. Most of these records seem to have been lost. No 
similar collection apparently survives in the Maltese archives. However, official Hospitaller 
correspondence to Europe helps us chart a reviewed picture of the Order’s record-keeping efforts in 
early modernity. Obviously the letters dispatched from the Convent only give indications about the 
nature, provenance, and occasionally the regularity of the accounts in question, without disclosing 
detailed contents or hints of possible uniformity of presentation between the various financial reports 
dispatched from all over Europe.  But we have to make do with what we have in the hope that future 
archival findings will fill gaps and clarify present doubts. We know that the receivers were obliged to 
send the Convent annual balance sheets reporting the financial situation of their priories. This is also 
explicitly stated in a letter to the Grand Prior of Germany in 1617.62 But some magistral letters hint 
clearly at regular financial accounts (usually termed conti or bilancio dei conti) received or solicited by 
the Convent on a more regular basis. At various instances in the first half of the seventeenth century, 
we find that income accounts were to be sent from Florence, High Germany, and Milan on a monthly 
basis.63 A letter dated April 1617 talks of a bilancetto, a brief balance account of the income and 
expenditure of a ricetta, sent to the Convent by the receiver of Naples for the previous month of 
February.64 Other letters tell us that balance accounts were also sent, expected, or solicited from 
                                                     
58 AOM 1381, Wignacourt to Poppel (Prior of Bohemia), f. 69v, 15 February 1602. 
59 AOM 1394, Wignacourt to Guinigi (Venice), f. 510r, 13 November 1615. 
60 At one point in 1656, Lascaris Castellar, in demanding a balance account from the Venetian receivership, states 
explicitly how important it was for the Convent to receive financial updates from its European priories: ‘e quanto 
per n[ost]ro governo per saper di somma ci potremo far capital perché senza q[uest]a luce vivremo alla cieca’. 
AOM 1646, Lascaris Castellar to Spreti (Venice), ff. 282v-283, 10 December 1656.  
61 Alison Hoppen, ‘The Finances of the Order of St John of Jerusalem in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, 
Europe Studies Review, iii, no. 2 (1973), 103-5; Ivan Grech, ‘Flow of Capital in the Mediterranean: Financial 
Connections between Genoa and Hospitaller Malta in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, International 
Journal of Maritime History, xvii, 2, (December 2005), 195. 
62 ‘ordini nostri che comandano à i Recev[ito]ri di mandar in Convento ogni anno il bilancio dell’introito et exito 
della lor Ricetta’. AOM 1396, Wignacourt to the Gran Priore d’Alemagna, ff. 253v-254r, 22 July 1617. 
63 In 1612, the receiver in Florence was asked to send a monthly ‘nota dell’introito’ to the Convent. AOM 1391, 
Wignacourt to Gaetani (Florence), ff. 443v-444r, 8 October 1612. In 1615 the receiver in High Germany was told 
to send monthly accounts ‘like his predecessors’, meaning that the practice had been established for quite some 
time. AOM 1394, Wignacourt to Rosabac (High Germany), f. 63, 20 January 1615. In 1656, the receiver in Milan 
was asked to send the Convent monthly records of current exchange rates on the back of balance sheets. AOM 
1646, Lascaris Castellar to Sforza Milzi (Milan), f. 189r, 20 May 1656. 
64 AOM 1396, Wignacourt to Ponte (Naples), f. 106r, 3 April 1617. 
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Palermo, Messina, Syracuse, Lombardy, Lyons, Venice, the Low Countries, Hungary, and Dacia, albeit 
with hardly any indication regarding the frequency of the reports.65 Very occasionally some letters give 
extra indications of the type of information contained in the accounts sent to Malta, such as a list of the 
commanders who paid their dues and those still indebted to the priory and the Convent,66 or regarding 
the appointment of commissioners to review the accounts of a specific Hospitaller jurisdiction.67 Others 
talk of a ‘succinct’ report on income and expenditure sent from Rome for example,68 or hint at obvious 
delays in the submission of annual balance accounts. Notwithstanding the Convent’s dictats, the 
problem of receiving the reports from distant territories when desired still prevailed. In 1605, the 
receiver in Bohemia sent the accounts of two successive years of his ricetta with the same dispatch.69 
Delays of many years were also registered from High Germany,70 and in 1616 even the receiver of 
Palermo was reprimanded for taking too long to send his accounts to Malta.71 
 For the smooth running of its networks, financial and otherwise, the Order had no option but to 
trust its judgement when recruiting personnel and to remedy when such judgement proved flawed. 
Alessandro Marzo Magno declares that credit networks in pre-industrial society were based on ‘one 
fundamental element: (…) trust’.72 Francesca Trivellato also emphasizes the importance of trust for the 
proper functioning of mail and financial networks in pre-industrial society. Tightly-knit organisations 
based on kinship, co-religion, and friendship were often the answer to keep together the web of 
interconnections needed for the transfer of information and currency across territories in a society where 
any form of effective control from a distance was next to impossible. There was no suprastructure of 
international surveillance.73 The Order was completely enmeshed in this network of international 
interconnectedness, for its continental property transcended national, political, and confessional 
boundaries, implying that the mechanisms for the mobilization of Hospitaller funds formed part of an 
international financial network which became a distinctive imprint of western capitalism by early 
modernity. Inevitably, even the Order had to rely on trust and reputation when recruiting its agents and, 
when the occasion arose, exploited family ties to ensure continuity in the running of a post, on a 
permanent or temporary level. When in 1608 the Hospitaller agent in Trapani in the northwestern tip of 
Sicily had to take leave from his post to travel to Campania, he proposed a relative of his as a temporary 
substitute,74 and in 1621 the Prior of Lombardy sent his nephew to the town of Asti to collect the 
payment of hundreds of sacks of wheat owed to the priory by the local community.75 In 1708, the 
Giavotto brothers succeeded each other as Hospitaller procurators in Scicli.76 
 Obviously the Order could wield the ultimate measures adopted by any organised institution to 
impose its will, what Trivellato calls ‘institutional coercion’, ranging from the handing out of warnings 
                                                     
65 For Palermo see, for example, AOM 1392, Wignacourt to Valdina (Palermo), f. 464, 23 September 1613. For 
Messina: AOM 1384, Wignacourt to Ventimiglia (Messina), ff. 369v-370r, 7 November 1605. For Syracuse: Ibid., 
Wignacourt to Settimo (Syracuse), ff. 74v-75r, 16 March 1605. For Lombardy: AOM 1385, Wignacourt to 
Bertone (Lombardy), ff. 277v-278r, 14 August 1606. For Lyons: Ibid., Wignacourt to Capece (Naples), f. 379r, 
21 November 1606. For Venice: AOM 1388, Wignacourt to Loschi (Venice), f. 247, 25 July 1609. For the Low 
Countries: AOM 1397, Wignacourt to Conrado [Schoffard], f. 112r, 30 March 1618. For Hungary: AOM 1387, 
Wignacourt to Prior di Ungaria, f. 213, 18 August 1608. For Datia: AOM 1385, Wignacourt to Hundt (Prior of 
Datia), ff. 181v-182r, 9 June 1606. 
66 AOM 1385, Wignacourt to Muchental (High Germany), f. 215r, 2 July 1606. 
67 AOM 1384, Wignacourt to the Prior of Germany, ff. 276v-277r, 25 August 1605. 
68 AOM 1398, Wignacourt to Aldobrandini (Rome), f. 89r, 20 February 1619. 
69 AOM 1384, Wignacourt to Metich (Bohemia), f. 275, 25 August 1605. 
70 AOM 1389, Wignacourt to Muchental (High Germany), f. 332r, 7 September 1610. 
71 AOM 1395, Wignacourt to Valdina (Palermo), ff. 160v-162r, 2 May 1616. 
72 Alessandro Marzo Magno, L’invenzione dei soldi. Quando la finanza parlava italiano  (Milan, Garzanti, 
2013), 162. 
73 Francesca Trivellato, ‘Merchants’ Letters Across Geographical and Social Boundaries’, in Cultural Exchange 
in Early Modern Europe Vol III. Correspondence and Cultural Exchange in Europe, 1400-1700, F. Bethencour 
and F. Egmond (eds.) Cambridge University Press, New York 2007, 80-103. 
74 AOM 1387, Wignacourt to La Marra (Palermo), ff. 327v-328, 25 October 1608. 
75 AOM 1400, Wignacourt to Gio Micheli Asinari, Gov[ernato]re della Città d’Asti, f. 215r, 20 April 1621. 
76 AOM 1469, Perellos y Rocaful to Domenico Giavotto (Scicli), f. 89, 9 May 1708. 
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to the dismissal of agents from their posts, with ensuing possible punishments. In 1614, the Hospitaller 
receiver of High Germany was severely reprimanded for not having remitted funds to Venice where 
they were needed to commission shipments to Malta77 and in 1620, Baldassarre Guinigi, former receiver 
of Venice, was imprisoned in the Maltese fortress of St Elmo for leaving his ricetta with over 11,000 
scudi in the red.78 On their part, Hospitaller representatives at various ranks, from ambassadors to 
procurators, had to weave their own local network of contacts within the confines of their post in order 
to satisfy demands dispatched from Malta.  In its communiqués to various Hospitaller agents stationed 
abroad, the Convent more than once insisted on the need to commission reliable individuals capable of 
carrying out the task in question, using adjectival phrases with specific terminology such as ‘diligent’, 
‘competent’, ‘faithful’, and ‘trustworthy’ to describe the qualities sought to keep the financial accounts 
of Hospitaller estates in High Germany; to deliver in person delicate correspondence from Messina; to 
transport by sea a hefty amount of specie from Naples; or to intercept the Hospitaller squadron at Capo 
Passero, in the southeastern corner of Sicily.79 Usually it was left to the official Hospitaller 
representative in question to find the right contact. Giacomo Buonsegno is described as an aide to the 
Venetian receivership who ran commissions for the ricetta for a number of years leading to 1602,80 and 
in 1614, the Order’s receiver in the Priory of Lombardy was to find a trusted person to carry out a 
financial transaction in Milan.81 Occasionally Hospitaller officials stationed in Europe and elsewhere 
were also sought for profiling purposes. Giovanni Malvicino was appointed Hospitaller receiver in 
Venice in 1602 after receiving favourable references from Langosco, his predecessor, and some other 
Hospitallers.82 In 1605, the Order asked the Prior of Germany to suggest a successor to Theodoro 
Dattenbergh, the receiver of Low Germany,83 and in 1610 La Marra, the receiver in Palermo, was to 
carry out an inquiry on Luciano Maida who was being considered as a candidate for the post of consul 
of the Maltese in Palermo to replace Nardo Parnis.84 
 Hospitaller officials posted abroad, in fact, had a key role in recommending individuals to the 
Convent for official posting in the service of Hospitaller Malta. In 1621, the Hospitaller agent in 
Lombardy dispatched favourable references to Malta about a certain Agostino Quartiero, 
recommending him for the appointment as principal notary of the Order in the State of Milan. Quartiero 
eventually got the post and his licence was renewed three years later.85 The agents had the obvious 
advantage of being more knowledgeable regarding what the locality they were posted in could offer, 
but at times the Order gave its own suggestions. In 1602, for the shipment of wine and biscuit from 
Trapani, the Order suggested Simon Corso, described as ‘familiar to the Religion’ and apt to carry out 
the consignment.86 But the ultimate decision usually lay with the agents, who first and foremost had to 
verify the availability of the contact in question. Friends and acquaintances could be enrolled as 
informants87 and influential contacts occasionally proved useful. An informer in Sardinia, potentially a 
more obscure and remote place than locations further north to Malta, could provide useful information 
for the provision of goods from that island.88 At one point in 1608, the Order was relying on the 
                                                     
77 AOM 1393A, Wignacourt to Rosabac (Upper Germany), f. 320, 31 July 1614. 
78 AOM 1399, Wignacourt to Scalamonti (Venice), ff. 569v-570r, 23 December 1620. 
79 For similar examples where Hospitaller agents were advised to commission ‘qualche persona diligente a voi 
ben vista in detto luogò’; a ‘persona pratica e fedele’; a ‘huomo fidato’; or a ‘persona fidata e diligente’, see, 
respectively, AOM 1388, Wignacourt to Ratenou (Upper Germany), ff. 343v-344r, 30 November 1609; AOM 
1386, Wignacourt to Torriglia (Messina), f. 311, 14 December 1607; AOM 1368, Wignacourt to Capece (Naples), 
ff. 150v-151r, 16 June 1607; and AOM 1384, Wignacourt to Falco (Scicli), ff. 155v-156r, 15 May 1605. 
80 AOM 1381, Wignacourt to Capece (Palermo), ff. 266v-267, 3 October 1602. 
81 AOM 1393A, Wignacourt to Pagliaro (Piedmont), ff. 365v-366r, 29 August 1614. 
82 AOM 1380, Wignacourt to Langosco (Venice), f. 49v, 17 January 1602. 
83 AOM 1384, Wignacourt to the Prior of Germany, ff. 247v-248r, 29 July 1605. 
84 AOM 1389, Wignacourt to La Marra (Palermo), f. 311v, 28 September 1610. 
85 A marginal entry confirms the licence renewal. AOM 1400, Alof de Wignacourt to Quartiero (Milan), f. 654, 
30 November 1621. 
86 AOM 1381, Wignacourt to Capece (Palermo), f. 331r, 27 November 1602. 
87 At one point, for example, the Hospitaller ambassador in Rome, Ruiz de Prado, was advised to inform himself 
‘per mezzo d’amici et di terze persone’, apart from the Hospitaller receiver in Rome, regarding a certain 
unspecified matter. AOM 1397, Wignacourt to Amb. Ruiz de Prado (Rome), f. 274, 7 August 1618. 
88 AOM 1383, Wignacourt to Capece (Palermo), ff. 221-223v, 16 July 1604. 
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intercession of the Count of Benevento to export Apulian cereals as alternative provisions for Malta in 
times of shortages.89 According to a letter dated January 1620, the acting Hospitaller receiver in Castile 
had to contract a loan from some ‘friends’ to cover a large payment on behalf of the Order made in 
Palermo,90 and in 1703 a certain prince Nixemi put in a word with Sicilian authorities on behalf of the 
Order to allow the Hospitaller squadron to load more provisions than usual in the ports of Syracuse and 
Augusta.91 
 On a more structural and official level, agents, and receivers in particular, could have their 
personal secretary who ran errands on their behalf or deputised in their posts,92 but it is not always 
possible from Hospitaller documentation to verify if an agent had a segretario or not. However, whether 
seconded or not, these agents were expected to transfer the Order’s funds from the European priories, 
and to do so they exploited the basic mechanisms of fund transfer available in early modernity: the bill 
of exchange, the transfer of cash by land and sea, or a combination of both. 
 
The Remittance of Prioral Funds: Bills of Exchange, Merchants, and Financiers 
The lure of finance proved irresistible for the Knights of St John, not only for its inherent promise of 
providing more readily available capital, but also because of the possibilities it afforded to mobilise and 
relocate it. Just like so many other states, bankers, proprietors, merchants, and traders, one of the main 
problems that the Order had to face was how to transfer its funds from where it was generated to where 
it was required. The Knights Hospitallers could not afford to remain alien to a financial world which 
was evolving in search of more efficient, logistically viable, and quicker credit transfer mechanisms. 
The Order had the great majority of its landed property and assets, and consequently its money, in 
Europe. When, and if the commanders managed to collect what was due from the estates they 
administered, they had the duty to pass a third of this income, the responsions, to the receiver 
responsible for the Hospitaller financial jurisdiction under which the estates in question fell. At that 
stage, according to instructions from the Convent, the receiver cashed and used the funds, in part or in 
full, for whatever transaction was required, or transferred them to the Convent or to other locations 
dictated from Malta. Towards the end of 1620, the Priory of Lombardy transferred 950 doubloons to a 
group of bankers in Genoa on behalf of the Order: 444 doubloons were withdrawn by the Hospitaller 
receiver in the city-port to cover commissions on behalf of the Convent, while the remaining 506 were 
transferred to Messina.93 In 1656, the Venetian receiver was instructed to withhold enough funds from 
the Venetian priory, and those transferred from Germany, to cover the purchase of timber from Fiume 
in the northeast corner of the Adriatic, since the Order lacked enough cash to effect the transaction from 
Malta.94  Funds could be transferred in stages according to the Order’s needs. In 1607, 18,000 scudi 
were to be remitted from Venice to Palermo in three tranches amounting to 3,500, 4,500, and 10,000 
scudi respectively.95 The route taken by Hospitaller funds depended also, in fact, on the Knights’ 
activities, commercial and otherwise, and the European markets from where the Order purchased its 
goods. Money could be needed in Genoa to pay for anchors commissioned for a galleon;96 in Venice to 
                                                     
89 ‘mediante la buona grazia del Conte di Benevento’. AOM 1387, Wignacourt to Capece (Naples), f. 153v, 31 
May 1608. 
90 AOM 1399, Wignacourt to Valdina (Palermo), f. 38, 15 January 1620. 
91 AOM 1464, Perellos y Rocaful, to Prince Nixemi (Palermo), f. 123, 15, September 1703. 
92 For some examples of secretaries or deputies to receivers see, AOM 1388, Wignacourt to Quartieri (Milan), f. 
359v, 30 November 1609; AOM 1391, Wignacourt to Abenante (Naples), f. 302v, 10 July 1612 and Ibid., 
Wignacourt to Caloro (Genoa), ff. 251v-252r, 19 June 1612. 
93 The bankers were Damiano and Henrio [de Frâche]. AOM 1399, Wignacourt to Semiomo (Lombardy), f. 578, 
23 December 1620. 
94 AOM 1646, Lascaris Castellar to Spreti (Venice), ff. 276v-277r, 25 September 1656 and Ibid., ff. 281v-282r, 
15 November 1656. 
95 AOM 1386, Wignacourt to La Marra (Palermo), ff. 257v-258r, 8 October 1607. 
96 For example: AOM 1399, Wignacourt to Semiomo (Lombardy), f. 306, 25 July 1620. 
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cover the systematic purchase of merchandise and its shipment to Malta;97 in Rome to sustain the costs 
incurred by court proceedings in the Sacra Rota (tribunal of the Roman Catholic Church);98 in Naples 
to export wine and other goods to Malta;99 in Messina to cover a timber consignment;100 in Trapani or 
Syracuse to provide the galleys with biscuit;101 or in Palermo for the usual payment of the tratte102 or to 
pay the tenderer providing the Convent with meat.103 
 Apart from the direct transfer of money in cash, which will be dealt with in greater detail later 
on in this study, the other fund-transfer option available for the receivers was that which in Hospitaller 
documentation is frequently referred to in Italian as the rimessa, literally a remittance of funds which 
usually had to involve at some stage the use of bills of exchange. Fernand Braudel and Richard Bonney 
seem to disagree about the breadth of the use and influence of the bill of exchange in the Mediterranean 
world and beyond in the pre-industrial era. According to the French historian, the bill of exchange, or 
something conceptually very close to it, was already being used in Islam by the tenth or eleventh century 
of the Christian era.104 In other instances, however, he does concede that it was only in Christendom 
that the bill was widely used, that in Syria it was debased of any value,105 and that its use in Islam was 
‘so exceptional (…) as to suggest that it was unknown in the East’.106 Bonney, on the other hand, states 
that currency transfer tools similar to the bill of exchange were ‘restricted to Latin Christendom’ and 
were alien to other parts of the world such as Muscovy, Islam, or Spanish America.107 Irrespective of 
where the truth lies, what is certain is that by early modernity the widespread use in Europe of the bill 
of exchange rendered it a protagonist of the rise of western capitalism. The advantages it offered to 
whoever used it were undisputed: it provided a loophole for circumventing strict ecclesiastical laws on 
usury; it allowed the concession of loans veiled as otherwise; it could be cashed by its deadline date or 
it could be renewed or transferred; it allowed the relocation of funds without the physical transfer of 
cash, reducing the risks of loss through thefts and physical assault; it could be used as payment for 
commercial transactions; it allowed the transfer of funds between places with different currencies, and 
rendered international payments possible when states prohibited the exportation of precious metals; it 
was a credit instrument which gave the possibility of financial gain through the fluctuations of exchange 
rates between different places.108 It was ‘a marvellous instrument’ according to Marzo Magno, but one 
which had its discomforts: it demanded ‘an organisation capable of covering both the market where it 
(the bill) was issued and the market where it was to be cashed’.109 The Hospitallers had such an 
‘organisation’ made out of receivers, procurators, and agents posted throughout Europe in the nerve 
centres of the Order’s prioral and financial network, not dissimilar to the network of continental 
                                                     
97 For example: AOM 1393A, Wignacourt to Guinigi (Florence), f. 383, 12 September 1614 and AOM 1400, 
Wignacourt to Scalamonti (Venice), f. 393, 18 July 1621. For the systematic shipment of goods from Venice to 
Malta, see Grech (2016), chapter four. 
98 AOM 1646, Lascaris Castellar to Domenico Carretto (Turin-Priory of Lombardy), f. 175v, 25 September 1656.  
99 AOM 1388, Wignacourt to Capece (Naples), ff. 65v-67r, 14 February 1609. 
100 For example: AOM 1385, Wignacourt to Ventimiglia (Messina), ff. 391v-392r, 16 December 1606. 
101 For Trapani, see for example AOM 1389, Wignacourt to La Marra (Palermo), ff. 71v-72, 24 March 1610. For 
Syracuse, see for example AOM 1385, Wignacourt to Settimo (Syracuse), f. 213r, 30 June 1606. 
102 For example: AOM 1388, Wignacourt to La Marra (Palermo), f. 233, 14 August 1609. 
103 AOM 1385, Wignacourt to La Marra (Palermo), f. 404v, 1 December 1606. 
104 Fernand Braudel (1985), 390.   
105 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. Trans S. Reynolds, 
2 vols (London, 1986), 370. 
106 Braudel (1986), 465.  
107 Richard Bonney, The European Dynastic States 1494-1660 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1991), 430-
1. 
108 Marzo Magno, 161-3. For an explanation of how the bill of exchange worked, see also Bonney, 430-1. Braudel 
recounts how in the late sixteenth century the broker Simón Ruiz bought and sold bills of exchange on the Medina 
del Campo-Florence axis purely to make a profit. Braudel (1986), 497. 
109 Marzo Magno, 163. 
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branches of medieval commercial enterprises such as that of the fourteenth-century merchant of Prato 
Francesco Datini, by some considered as the very father of the cambiale as used in western Europe.110 
 To put it simply and succinctly, the bill of exchange was a credit instrument containing a 
promise of payment to another party.111  For the Order during the period under study, the bill or letter 
of exchange provided the possibility to relocate its funds from its continental priories dispersed mainly 
in Iberia, France, Flanders, High and Low Germany, Bohemia, and Italy. In a nutshell, the transfer 
mechanism can be explained thus:112 the Order might need a sum of money in Palermo to purchase 
wheat, for example. If the receiver of Palermo was not in possession of the necessary amount of funds, 
he would have to relocate the required sum from one of the Hospitaller priories in Europe. To do so he 
would have to find an individual or a group of individuals, who could be merchants or financiers, or a 
financial institution (who we can call the ‘creditor’), with enough cash available in Palermo to cover 
the sum required by the receiver, usually against the payment of a commission. The receiver would then 
hand the creditor the bill of exchange – usually sent to him from a Hospitaller priory where the Order 
was solvent - covering the entire sum through funds from the Hospitaller priory in question. The 
creditor, or whoever he appointed by proxy, would then be able to clear the bill and be reimbursed his 
due in markets like Castile, Barcelona, or Lyons, for example, centres where the Order had receivers 
who collected Hospitaller funds from the respective priories in Iberia and France, and consequently 
places where the Order was solvent. In this way the rimessa would have been effected, without any 
actual physical transfer of money taking place, and the Order would have its sum available in Palermo 
to purchase its wheat.  
 For the whole mechanism to work, the Order needed to be financially covered in the 
receiverships where the bills were cleared, mainly Castile, Barcelona, Lyons, High and Low Germany, 
Bohemia, and the main receiverships in Italy, that is Lombardy, Venice, Florence, and Naples. What 
emerges from the Hospitaller documentation consulted is that Palermo and Messina113 were vital 
Hospitaller financial centres where substantial sums from the Order’s continental priories were 
ultimately deposited through remittances, and occasionally cashed.114 Although this study cannot boast 
of documentary material from any such bills involving Hospitaller fund-transfer transactions from 
European priories for the period under study, alternative documentary sources will be used to recreate 
the stages, fluxes, and routes along which these remittances travelled, allowing the Order to transfer 
funds from its European estates. This fund-transfer mechanism is in fact illustrated, or hinted at, in 
several letters of the magistral outgoing correspondence and occasionally in other Hospitaller sources 
such as the Libri Conciliorum.115 Some examples might help us understand this financial mechanism 
better.   
 In 1606, the Order’s receiver in Palermo, La Marra, was to collect from a certain Theodaldo 
Thedaldi 700 scudi on behalf of a secretary of the Order, Commander Vigliasecca, through the 
conversion of a bill of exchange signed by Ferramonti Pallavicino of Valladolid.116 Although we are 
                                                     
110 Ibid., 160. Iris Origo immortalised Datini’s life in a book about the merchant’s activities but is certain that 
Datini was not the inventor of the modern bill of exchange, although he used it frequently. Iris Origo, The 
Merchant of Prato. Daily Life in a Medieval Italian City (London, Penguin Books, 1992), 147. 
111 The Zingarelli dictionary defines it as a ‘credit instrument containing a promise made by a person to pay, or 
appoint someone in his/her stead to pay, another person a sum of money. Zingarelli, Nicola (ed.), Il nuovo 
Zingarelli. Vocabolario della lingua italiana (Bologna, Zanichelli, 1987). According to Iris Origo, ‘the bill of 
exchange made it possible to transfer purchasing power without the shipment of actual coins’. Origo, 82. 
112 Giuseppe Felloni describes the mechanism of the use of the bill of exchange with reference to merchants and 
their representatives located in two different European markets. Felloni, 107-8. Felloni’s model can be adapted to 
the type of transactions used by the Order to relocate prioral funds. 
113 In 1615, for example, the receivers of Germany, Bohemia, Lombardy, Florence, Genoa, and Naples were all 
commissioned to transfer funds to Messina. AOM 1394, Wignacourt to Sollima (Messina), f. 461, 8 October 1615. 
114 Grech (2005), 199. 
115 For some examples of transactions effected with the use of bills of exchange addressed to places like Castile, 
France, or other places, see AOM 107, f. 191r, 20 April 1623; Ibid., f. 202v, 10 June 1623; Ibid., f. 205v, 14 June 
1623; Ibid., f. 210v, 3 July 1623; Ibid., f. 223r, October 1623.  
116 AOM 1385, Wignacourt to La Marra (Palermo), ff. 213v-214r, 1 July 1606. 
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not told if Viglasecca collected the sum for personal use or on behalf of the Order, the transaction 
constitutes an example of how a sum is made available in one place to be reimbursed in another through 
the bill of exchange mechanism. Hospitaller documents provide other examples where similar 
transactions were carried out to transfer the Order’s money. In 1612, the Order was planning to cash an 
unspecified sum in Palermo to subsequently reimburse it in Castile.117 In 1617 the Order’s financial 
agent in Barcelona, Cotoner, sent letters of exchange to Malta to be eventually cashed by the Hospitaller 
receiver in Palermo,118 and more bills amounting to 2,582 florins were to be cashed in Messina at the 
rate of 6 tarì per florin from the merchants Carlo Frenes and Onofrio Carbonel.119 Later on that year, 
the receiver in Messina was to present a number of letters of exchange sent from Venice to some 
merchants operating in the Sicilian city-port and to deposit the proceeds in a bank in Messina.120 Similar 
transactions were carried out on the Bohemia-Messina axis in 1619,121 and thousands of reals a month 
for a specific period would be reimbursed in Madrid or Valladolid by the Order’s receiver in Castile to 
whoever was indicated on letters of exchange sent from Scicli.122 Bills cashed in Palermo at the rate of 
12 tarì per scudo, could ultimately be reimbursed in Castile at 10 reali per scudo, for example.123 
 Obviously these payments could go through only if the Order was solvent in the priories where 
the final reimbursements were effected, subject that is to the successful and timely collection of the 
responsions. Early in 1615, the Order was planning a remittance of 16,000 scudi on the Castile-Palermo 
axis. A certain Don Ottavio d’Aragona provided the receivership of Palermo with the cash for the 
purchase of a wheat consignment. He was handed the bills of exchange addressed to Receiver Brisegno, 
the Hospitaller receiver in Castile. It was hoped that by the time d’Aragona arrived in Madrid to cash 
his due, Brisegno would have the sum available to cover the payment. If not, it was agreed to delay the 
payment till May of that year until the responsions were collected by the Castilian receivership.124 
Similar transactions, therefore, could take months to be concluded, but allowed the Order to have ready 
cash where it was needed. Credit on bills of exchange, in fact, was cashable in stages and their clearance 
could be diffused through time, allowing a receiver to effect some urgent payments while buying time 
to receive reassurance from European priories about the solvency of the ricetta where the 
reimbursement was to take place. In 1620, the Hospitaller receivership in Palermo was instructed to 
cash only half of the 20,000 libre in bills at its disposal, 3,000 libre of which were to be deposited in 
Syracuse to pay for biscuit and saltpetre.125 In this way the Order gained time to receive notification 
from Spain that its Castilian coffers could cover the remaining bills in the hands of the receiver in 
Palermo.126 
 It was important for the Order’s agents on the receiving end of these remittances to cultivate 
contacts with wealthy members of the community within or in the vicinity of their financial jurisdiction 
in order to have valid alternatives when cash was needed. At one point in 1614, the Hospitaller receiver 
in Palermo had the Countess of Modica as an alternative creditor in case a substantial cambio of 120,000 
reali with Don Ottavio d’Aragona did not go through, and in the meantime was negotiating a cambio 
of 4,000 scudi with a certain Donna Maria Vries who was known in the Convent as having cash 
available.127 The Order, on its part, had to be kept updated by its receivers deployed throughout the 
continent on the state of the coffers of the respective ricette to be able to decide on the provenance and 
                                                     
117 AOM 1386, Wignacourt to La Marra (Palermo), f. 312r, 14 December 1607.  
118 AOM 1396, Wignacourt to Valdina (Palermo), f. 353, 22 October 1617. 
119 AOM 1396, Wignacourt to Balsamo (Messina), f. 353v, 22 October 1617. 
120 ‘per riscuotersi costì in Messina da cotesti mercanti alcuni partiti di denari (…) rimetterli subito in cotesta 
tavola di Messina’. AOM 1396, Wignacourt to Balsamo (Messina), f. 403r, 7 December 1617. 
121 ‘rimessivi di Bohemia dal Ric[evito]re Nostiz’. AOM 1398, Wignacourt to Balsamo (Messina), ff. 452v-453r, 
30 November 1619. 
122 AOM 1399, Wignacourt to Lo Porto (Scicli), ff. 552v-553r, 30 November 1620. 
123 AOM 1399, Wignacourt to Valdina (Palermo), f. 337, 4 August 1620. 
124 AOM 1394, Wignacourt to Valdina (Palermo), ff. 36v-37, 20 January 1615. 
125 AOM 1399, Wignacourt to Valdina (Palermo), ff. 208v-209, 22 May 1620. 
126 Ibid., ff. 208v-209, 22 May 1620. 
127 ‘che per quanto ci è stato detto tiene il den[a]ro in ordine’. AOM 1393A, Wignacourt to Valdina (Palermo), 
ff. 489-490r, 26 November 1614. 
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the amount of remittances it was in a position to effect. In the summer of 1617, the Convent was waiting 
for information from Spain to see what funds could be transferred to Palermo, also because at the time 
no bills could be issued on Lyons or other places in France.128 These bills were also used in the reverse 
direction, allowing Hospitallers and members of the Maltese population to deposit sums in the Common 
Treasury and withdraw them from a foreign bank or one of the Order’s receivers in Europe against the 
presentation of a bill of exchange,129 a mechanism used also by the Order to pay for commissions 
abroad. To pay for the building of a galley in Barcelona in 1604, money could be withdrawn from 
Palermo or from any place where the money of the foundation set up on purpose for the building of the 
galley was deposited.130 
 Similar fund-transfer mechanisms, widely adopted in western Europe since medieval times, 
were quite a frequent practice in Hospitaller administration. At one point in 1621, it is recorded that the 
Order’s agent in Venice was receiving remittances from Germany on ‘a daily basis’,131 a frequency 
which at face value might seem rather suspicious if afforded literal status, yet one which seems to be 
corroborated by other similar episodes. In 1607, for example, in conjunction with an abundance of 
debased currency in Sicilian markets, receivers in Italy were expected to affect daily remittances to 
Palermo.132 These transfers allowed the Order of St John to effect payments on a continental level, with 
Hospitaller money travelling along several routes and in all directions in western Europe’s financial 
network, from the coasts of the Atlantic and the heart of Europe, to the midst of the Mediterranean. 
Thus a cargo of goods shipped to the Convent by a merchant from Venice could be paid with letters of 
exchange cashed in Paris;133 proceeds from the sale of rice in Corfu could end up deposited in Naples;134 
and a deposit of cruzadi in Lisbon allowed a payment in Sicilian currency in Messina through the 
financial mediation of the Order’s receiver in Genoa.135 
 Of course, fund transfers could be aborted, delayed, or re-thought according to unfavourable 
exchange rates, the reluctance of the Order to fork out the commissions demanded on the transfer, or 
the whims of creditors unconvinced by the reimbursement guarantees provided by the Order. In 1612, 
a remittance through letters of exchange for 5,450 ducats on the Bohemia-Venice connection was not 
accepted and the bills were sent back to Bohemia.136 The following year, 4,000 florins remitted from 
Bohemia were not cashed in Venice since the Order’s merchant of reference in the Serenissima was 
temporarily absent and alternative financiers consulted were demanding an ‘exorbitant’ interest on the 
exchange.137 In 1614, the Order was finding it difficult to cash a bill of 120,000 reali in Palermo.138  In 
1620 it was pointed out to the Hospitaller receiver in Lombardy that some merchants in Messina were 
refusing to clear bills for 2,500 scudi he had remitted to the Sicilian port on behalf of the Order.139 From 
similar episodes it emerges that, apart from its own network of agents, the Order needed the services of 
a host of financiers, merchants, bankers, or individuals with the required cash available who were 
involved in the craft of fund transfer and were in a position to supply the Knights with cash where it 
was required, allowing the Order to effect payments on an international level since its pre-Malta phase 
along fund-transfer routes which became established through time.  
                                                     
128 AOM 1396, Wignacourt to Valdina (Palermo), ff. 246-247r, 22 July 1617. 
129 Blouet, 107. See also some of the examples from AOM 107 in footnote 115 and AOM 1006, passim, for the 
years 1770 to 1798. 
130 AOM 101, f. 34r, 5 April 1604. 
131 ‘giornalmente’. AOM 1400, Wignacourt to Hospitaller Scipione Trento, ff. 588v-589r, 24 October 1621. 
132 AOM 1386, Wignacourt to La Marra (Palermo), ff. 215-216r, 2 September 1607. 
133 AOM 1400, Wignacourt to David [Vanusle] (Venice), ff. 357v-358r, 30 June 1621. 
134 AOM 1389, Wignacourt to Loschi (Venice), f. 104, 24 April 1610. 
135 ‘con poliza da pagarsi à vista à Cesare Passalacqua’. AOM 1429, Lascaris Castellar to Spinola (Genoa), f. 
73r, 21 May 1651. 
136 AOM 1391, Wignacourt to Metich (Bohemia), f. 259, 19 June 1612. 
137 The merchant who apparently provided the Hospitaller receivership in Venice with cash on a regular basis was 
a certain Seifrid. AOM 1392, Wignacourt to Metich (Bohemia), f. 116r, 8 March 1613. 
138 AOM 1393A, Wignacourt to Valdina (Palermo), f. 428v, 10 October 1614. 
139 AOM 1399, Wignacourt to Semiomo (Lombardy), ff. 486v-487, 10 October 1620. 
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Patterns of Hospitaller Fund Transfer 
 
 
Bronstein and Luttrell do give generic indications of Hospitaller fund transfers from Europe, effected 
to finance the Order’s activities in the Levant in the pre-Malta period, but without elaborating on the 
mechanisms used except for occasional cash transfers by sea.140 One has to see if and to what extent the 
Order’s medieval sources consulted by these historians elaborate on the kind of financial transactions 
adopted in the first place. Commenting on the correspondence consulted to reconstruct contacts between 
Latin Syria and some of the Order’s western priories in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Bronstein 
denounces the generic nature of a good part of the letters she sourced, which make it difficult for the 
historian to pin down even the very ‘needs’ of the Hospitallers.141 The early modernist is apparently 
more privileged in this regard, for Hospitaller sources of the Malta phase are generous in outlining not 
only the credit transfer mechanisms adopted by the Order, but also the patterns and routes of these 
transfers which emerge from the Knights’ financial and communication network. According to Luttrell, 
in the fourteenth century the Order employed the services of several financiers, mostly Tuscan, and 
Florentine in particular, to transport its funds from Paris, London, and Lisbon to Avignon; and from 
Catalonia, France, and Venice, to Rhodes. Barcelona and Venice apparently became important 
fourteenth-century centres for the transport of Hospitaller funds from Iberia and Germany respectively 
to the Levant, and merchants from Narbonne occasionally transported to the Levant the Order’s money 
collected from Languedoc.142 
 As outlined above, the Order continued to rely on the services of financiers in its Malta phase 
and some Hospitaller fund transfer patterns persisted, at least in part, up to early modernity. Venice and 
Barcelona, for example, retained their role in the transfer of the Order’s funds from Germany and Iberia 
                                                     
140 Luttrell, ‘Actividades economicas’, 179; 180; 182; Luttrell, ‘Interessi fiorentini’, 321-2; Bronstein, 79; 140. 
141 Ibid., 140. 
142 Luttrell, ‘Actividades economicas’, 175-182; Luttrell, ‘Interessi fiorentini’, 321-2. 
 
Major Patterns of Hospitaller Fund Transfers 
•Genoa 
•Venice 
Iberian funds 
Sicily 
Malta 
French 
funds 
Funds from Germany 
and N. Europe 
Funds from 
Bohemia 
Journal of Maltese History, volume 5, number 2 (2018) 
 
19 
 
respectively, with the difference that the terminal point of the transfer was usually Sicily or Malta, not 
Rhodes.143 Hospitaller documentary sources establish the centrality of Italy for the relocation of the 
Order of St John’s funds from Europe in early modernity. By the early decades of the seventeenth 
century, Italy was benefitting from a rush in precious metals which started flowing through its exchange 
markets with the decline of Antwerp, taking on the role of prime vector of Spanish silver.144 The 
peninsula’s geography and protagonism in the financial evolution of the West, especially from the 
Renaissance onwards,145 rendered it the ideal vehicle through which the Knights could channel their 
money from Iberia, France, Flanders, Germany, and Bohemia.146 Just as in the case of the flux of mail, 
news-sheets, and avvisi, apart from the financial accounts outlined earlier,147 the Order’s displacement 
west and ultimate settlement on Malta shortened, and therefore hastened and facilitated all sorts of 
contacts with Italy, and consequently with the rest of Europe.  The dispatch of a good part of Hospitaller 
remittances at some stage had an Italian city as a transitory or final destination. Obviously, since in the 
case of remittances similar to the ones explained above, the effective transfer involved bills of exchange, 
the flow of remittances followed established patterns of mail transfer to and from Hospitaller Malta. 
Cities like Venice and Genoa, therefore, played vital roles for the collection and redistribution of 
Hospitaller funds. Through the Serenissima, the Order collected and redistributed its funds from High 
and Low Germany and from Bohemia, apart from the funds of the Priory of Venice.148 Genoa was used 
as a collecting station for Hospitaller funds from the Priory of Lombardy and occasionally Iberia, 
France, Germany, and Flanders.149 Once the Order’s funds were deposited in Genoa and Venice, the 
Hospitaller receivers in these cities would in turn remit them, in full or in part, to other collecting 
stations according to the Order’s and Malta’s needs, with the ultimate destination often being Malta, 
Palermo, or Messina as explained earlier.  
Florence was a favourite intermediate stage in the remittance south of Hospitaller funds along 
the Italian peninsula. Funds from Bohemia and Germany could find their way to Florence, either directly 
or through Venice for example.150 Funds thus collected in Florence could be subsequently redirected in 
full or in part to Rome, Naples, or Sicily, for example.151 On its part, Palermo was a collecting station 
                                                     
143 Grech (2005), passim; Ivan Grech, ‘Struggling Against Isolation. Communication Lines and the Circulation of 
News in the Mediterranean:  The Case of Seventeenth-Century Malta’, Journal of Mediterranean Studies, vol.16, 
1/2, Malta 2006, 168. 
144 Braudel (1986), 494-6; 499. 
145 Ferguson, 70. 
146 The priories of Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland were grouped under the Tongue of Germany. The Priory of 
Hungary was suppressed around 1538. From 1252, Poland was normally included under the title of Bohemian 
priors. Up to 1610, the only Polish preceptory was that of Posen and an independent Polish priory was only formed 
in 1775. The Order’s estates in the Low Countries usually fell under the jurisdiction of Hospitaller preceptories 
in Germany. Sire (1996), 190-7. The Order’s property in England and Ireland was confiscated by Henry VII in 
1540 (Ibid.,186). 
147 For the relay of such written information from Europe to Hospitaller Malta, see Grech (2016), passim. 
148 For the Germany-Venice fund trail, see AOM 1383, Wignacourt to Hundt (Germany), ff. 323v-324, 27 
September 1604 and AOM 1387, Wignacourt to Muchental (High Germany), f. 60v, 9 March 1608. For the 
Bohemia-Venice fund trail, see above and AOM 1385, Wignacourt to Metich (Bohemia), f. 60r, 23 January 1606 
and AOM 1390, Wignacourt to Guinigi (Venice), ff. 325v-326r, 23 September 1611. 
149 Grech (2005), 197-200. For the Flanders-Genoa financial connection see, for example, AOM 1384, Wignacourt 
to Alfonso D’Avolos (Flanders), f. 416r, 30 December 1605 and AOM 1390, Wignacourt to Quartiero (Milan), f. 
424r, 14 November 1611. According to Sire, since the twelfth century Hospitaller preceptories in territories 
considered today as Swiss and Dutch formed part of the Tongue of Germany and therefore their proceeds formed 
part of the Order’s German responsions. Sire (1996), 192. In 1621, for example, Hospitaller funds from Germany 
‘et altre parti’ were to be channelled to Venice. AOM 1400, Wignacourt to Scipione Trento, f. 166v, 4 April 
1621.   
150 For the Bohemia-Venice-Florence-Malta fund trail see, for example, AOM 1390, Wignacourt to Guinigi 
(Venice), 325v-326r, 23 September 1611. For possible Germany-Florence fund transfers see, for example, AOM 
1386, Wignacourt to Muchental (High Germany), ff. 146-148r, 9 June 1607. 
151 For example: AOM 1384, Wignacourt to Medici (Florence), f. 411, 30 December 1605; AOM 1390, 
Wignacourt to Gaetani (Florence), f. 295r, 31 August 1611;  AOM 1393, Wignacourt to Sollima (Messina), ff. 
157v-158r, 8 April 1614. 
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for Hospitaller remittances from Iberia and France.152 The Order’s Iberian funds, including those of 
Valladolid, Aragon, Navarre, and Portugal, were usually deposited in Madrid and those of France, 
including those of Paris, Tolouse, Aquitaine, and Champagne, in Lyons.153 
 
Flow chart: Patterns of Hospitaller Fund Transfer to Sicily via Venice 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Funds collected from Spanish commanderies could subsequently be relocated to Barcelona to be 
transferred elsewhere.154 As outlined above, the Order’s receivers in Castile, usually residing in Madrid 
or Valladolid,155 and the Hospitaller contact point in Barcelona156 had a direct communication line with 
the receiver in Palermo for the remittance of funds to Sicily.157 Similarly, French responsions intended 
for remission to Sicily via bills, were deposited in Lyons for subsequent transfer to Palermo, for 
example, either directly or else through Genoa.158  
Messina was the other major Sicilian depository of Hospitaller funds.159 As a busy central 
Mediterranean port, holder of an industrious mint, vibrant trading hub for the production and 
                                                     
152 Grech (2005), 199. 
153 This transfer pattern is occasionally stated explicitly in Hospitaller documentation: le ricette di Madrid e (…) 
Leone dove cadono rispettivamente tutti gli effetti della Relig[ione] di Francia e Spagna. AOM 262, ff. 246v-
247r, 4 May 1686. See also AOM 262, f. 7v and 16v, 21 May 1672. For the Lyons-Palermo currency remittances 
see also, for example, AOM 1385, Wignacourt to La Marra (Palermo), f. 202, 30 June 1606. 
154 See Grech (2016), chapter seven. See also AOM 432, ff. 253-254, 27 June 1569. 
155 In 1609, referring to the Order’s receiver in Castile, Wignacourt said that he usually resided in Valladolid: 
‘solendo egli risiedere a Valladolid’. AOM 1388, Wignacourt to the Governatore of Modica, f. 281v, 28 August 
1609. 
156 The Order’s financial agent in Barcelona was occasionally referred to with the term depositario, that is someone 
who receives, an office where funds were deposited, similarly to a receiver, but probably without the authority or 
designation to collect funds directly from the Order’s estates. Occasionally, in fact, that of depositario and receiver 
in Hospitaller documentation seem to be distinct designations. AOM 455, f. 239 r. 
157 In 1608, for example, writing to the Governor of the County of Modica in Southern Sicily, Wignacourt 
informed him that it was the Order’s normal practice to transfer its Spanish funds to Palermo. AOM 1386, 
Wignacourt to the Governatore di Modica, Paolo la Restia, f. 52, 21 February 1608. 
158 Grech (2005), 196. For the Lyons-Palermo financial connection see, for example, AOM 1380, Wignacourt to 
Staiti (Palermo), f. 188r, 25 July 1601; AOM 1388, Wignacourt to La Marra (Palermo), ff. 146-147, 30 April 
1609; and AOM 1400, Wignacourt to Valdina (Palermo), ff. 328-329, 16 June 1621. 
159 Funds could be deposited in Messina from Genoa or ‘elsewhere’. AOM 1387, Wignacourt to Torriglia 
(Messina), f. 67, 11 March 1608. For the Genoa-Messina fund transfer trail, see also AOM 1385, Wignacourt to 
Ventimiglia (Messina), f. 66r, 23 January 1606. 
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redistribution of silk,160 and Hospitaller Malta’s prime mail connection with Italy,161 Messina was an 
obvious magnet for the Order’s funds from Italian and other European priories. It was a terminal credit 
depository similar to Palermo, from where Hospitaller wheat and other merchandise were subsidized, 
and a final stop on the Order’s currency trail before cash was shipped to Malta. The city port’s financial 
affairs could have regional economic repurcussions. Fairs held in Messina could dry up the availability 
of capital in Sicilian markets, momentarily jeopardizing currency exchanges and the potential relocation 
of funds on an international level, thus creating financial exchange problems for the Order. In 1606, the 
exchange of funds on the Palermo-Barcelona axis for the purchase of wheat stalled. The Hospitaller 
receiver in Palermo was advised to wait for the right moment before operating remittances from 
Catalonia in order to let the effects of a fair being held in Messina to wear down.162 Notwithstanding 
similar conjunctures, the city port remained a vital depository in the Order’s early modern financial 
network. It was in Messina that prioral funds from France, Spain, Italy, and Germany were to be 
remitted during the Ottoman siege of Malta of 1565 to help sustain Malta’s defence.163 At one point in 
1613, the Order’s receiver in Florence was instructed to transfer all responsions from then on to 
Messina,164 and Grand Master Lascaris Castellar’s administration waxed lyrical when speaking of the 
city on the straits, describing it as the best place where to deposit Hospitaller funds, a coffer from where 
credit could be sourced more readily.165 
 Through this financial network, Hospitaller funds from Germany, Bohemia, Castile, Barcelona, 
Lyons, Lombardy, Venice, Genoa, Florence, and Naples found their way to Sicily, Malta or wherever 
they were required. For this network to operate efficiently and effectively, the Common Treasury had 
to communicate the financial needs of Hospitaller Malta to the various receivers and procurators posted 
on the continent. It was up to these representatives to keep the Convent updated on the collection stage 
of the responsions, and consequently on whether the priories were solvent or not, on the availability of 
bullion in European markets, and on the commodity prices on a continental level.166 This allowed the 
Order to decide from where it could draw funds and where these had to be relocated according to 
Hospitaller Malta’s needs.   
 
Commercial and Financial Information, Liquidity Problems, and Financial Re-Routing 
The direction of the flow of the remittances was not always unilateral vis-à-vis the patterns described 
above. Late in 1614, for example, thousands of ducats and gold scudi were to be transferred from 
Florence and Naples to Venice where hefty funds were needed to buy various supplies and ship them 
over to the Convent.167 At times, Hospitaller funds deposited in Sicily were subsequently remitted to 
Genoa to exploit the more favourable exchange rates operative at the time in question on the Ligurian 
                                                     
160 For a generic overview of Messina’s  economic and maritime activity and relevance in early modernity, see 
Salvatore Bottari, Post Res Perditas. Messina 1678-1713 (Messina, Adizioni Dr. Antonino Sfameni, 2005) and 
Salvatore Bottari, ‘The Port of Messina, 1591-1783’, in Making Waves in the Mediterranean (Sulle onde del 
Mediterraneo). Proceedings of the 2nd MMHN Conference. Messina and Taormina, 4-7 May 2006, M. D’Angelo, 
G. Harlaftis, and C. Vassallo (eds.) Istituto di Studi Storici Gaetano Salvemini, Messina 2010, 627-50.  
161 Grech (2016), chapters two and three. 
162 ‘che allora speriamo si cambiarà con minor disavantaggio che al presente poiche sarà cessato l’impedimento 
della fiera di Messina che si suol assorbire tutto il den[a]ro’. AOM 1385, Wignacourt to La Marra (Palermo), ff. 
252v-253, 8 August 1606.  
163 Iacomo Bosio, Dell’Istoria della Sacra Religione et Ill. Militia di S. Gio. Gierosolimitano, vol. iii, 543. (Venice, 
1695). 
164 AOM 1392, Wignacourt to Gaetani (Florence), f. 521r, 20 October 1613. 
165 Hospitaller receivers in Italy were encouraged to remit funds in Messina, described as the ‘luogo più comodo 
per valersene (ie: dei soldi) la Religione prontamente’. AOM 259, f. 38, 20 August 1652. 
166 In 1652, for example, the Procurators of the Order’s Common Treasury reported to the grand master and 
Council on the financial reports sent by the receivers of Genoa, Madrid, and Valladolid regarding the ‘stato della 
moneta’ in Spain. AOM 259, f. 61v. 
167 AOM 1393A, Wignacourt to Gaetani (Florence), f. 383, 12 September 1614; Ibid., Wignacourt to Abenante 
(Naples), f. 384r, 12 September 1614; Ibid., Wignacourt to Guinigi, f. 490v, 26 November 1614. 
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market.168 One of the receivers’ tasks, in fact, was to remain informed on the exchange rates offered on 
the various financial markets and to liaise with the Common Treasury in Malta to be able to choose the 
best market possible where to exchange Hospitaller funds, subject to feasibility and contemporary 
contingencies, with the aim of sparing the Order’s Treasury excessive payments on interests. The 
receiver in Florence, for example, could be afforded the responsibility to decide whether to remit funds 
to Naples or Sicily, depending on which option best suited the Order’s financial interests.169 In 1614 the 
Order’s receiver in Bohemia proposed to remit Bohemian responsions to Amsterdam where they could 
be cashed and shipped down the Atlantic to Messina in order to avoid the usual remittance through 
Venice, where interests for these financial transactions were apparently too high at the time.170 The 
Common Treasury proposed a trial remittance of 2,000 ducats on this route to judge its feasibility and 
profitability when compared to the Venetian route. The Bohemian receivership had to report to the 
Convent once the remittance was effected.171 Apparently the transaction proved worthwhile although 
the other examples available for this study to corroborate this claim are few and far apart. We know that 
in 1617, 2,000 scudi were transferred on the Bohemia-Amsterdam route and another 1,000 scudi were 
to be relocated on the same route the following May.172 In the summer of 1619 the receiver in Messina 
was asked to verify if a remittance of 1,000 scudi on the Bohemia-Amsterdam route to Messina had 
been carried out.173 
 The high interests demanded for similar transactions on the Venetian market apparently 
constituted a recurrent theme in the Hospitaller financial world, to an extent that they could induce the 
reconsideration of currency fluxes along time-honoured remittance routes such as that from High 
Germany to Venice. In 1607, the Order gave instructions for its German funds to be transferred to Genoa 
or Florence if interests on the Venetian market remained high,174 and three years later the Order 
expressed its dismay that fund remittances from Germany were being directed to Venice and not 
Genoa.175 Problems due to distance and accessibility could crop up at the responsion-collection stage. 
In the mid-seventeenth century, the commanders of the Priory of High Germany were complaining that 
depositing responsions in cash with the receiver of the priory was no longer feasible.176 His residence 
(not specified here), claimed the commanders, was too distant and the dangers and expenses of cash 
transport were too high. The city of Basle,177 deemed more reachable by the dissident German 
commanders, was suggested as an alternative collecting station, a centre where the Order could post an 
intermediary depositario with the authority to receive responsions178 and forward them to the next 
remittance stage. The Swiss city, which had been used earlier in the Order’s history to remit Hospitaller 
funds to Venice,179 was also suggested because of the presence of bankers who could transfer 
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Hospitaller money in Lyons and spare the Order the interests being demanded in Venice.180 Months 
after it was presented, however, the proposal was ditched and the normal practice of depositing 
responsions with the receiver of High Germany was resumed. It was then up to the receiver to decide 
whether to remit the funds to Lyons or Venice according to convenience.181 
 It was essential for the Order to remain informed on the market situation within the orbit of its 
financial and communication network. Knowledge on commodity prices, currency exchange rates, and 
the degree of liquidity in markets was vital in order to purchase merchandise and relocate prioral funds 
accordingly in the perennial attempt to strike the best possible deal by intercepting the most favourable 
exchange rate, exploiting the least expensive purchase, and concluding the most economic transaction. 
Early modernity witnessed the rise of business, commercial, and financial information in merchants’ 
letters and otherwise.182 By 1540 one could already find printed commodity price lists in Antwerp.183 
In Florence, currency exchange rates were quoted on a weekly basis184 and economic information on a 
European level was available on periodical publications from the late 1500s.185 The need of knowledge 
on currency-related news, such as product availability and description, insurance rates, and information 
on the negotiability of letters of exchange, generated business correspondence.186 The Order’s receivers 
and agents on the continent somehow or other intercepted this kind of information, although it’s very 
difficult to say from which source they derived it. This study can boast of one reference, sourced from 
the Order’s manuscripts, to what appears to have been an official exchange-rate list dated 29 April 1621 
and mentioned in a letter addressed to the receiver in Naples in May 1621.187 But hardly any conclusions 
can be drawn from a single reference, so we cannot say that Hospitaller personnel consulted similar 
exchange rate lists on a regular basis, although it is very plausible. It is easy to imagine, however, that 
some of the information was also gained first hand from the knowledge of their jurisdiction or from 
informants. Whichever the source, Hospitaller agents themselves transmitted this kind of economic 
information on an institutional level to Malta. Hospitaller documents attest the flow of similar economic 
and financial news to the Convent dispatched from Hospitaller continental personnel.  
 These updates allowed the Order to adapt its purchase strategy according to what was offered 
on markets within its reach. Thus the Order was in a position to know that better quality and cheaper 
biscuit for its galley crews could be fetched in Trapani rather than Syracuse or Palermo,188 or the other 
way round according to contingencies;189  that caulking material of better price and quality could be 
found in Syracuse rather than Messina,190 and what price was being asked for the wholesale of tallow 
in Sardinia,191 or for rice in Candia.192 Hospitaller agents managed to obtain detailed price lists for the 
export of grain, timber, metals, and oarsmen from Naples;193 they were briefed that olive oil was being 
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sold cheaply at Monopoli in Apulia,194 and received tips regarding the price of muskets in Lombardy195 
and of ammunition in England.196 They spared the Order extra expenses on the purchase of gunpowder 
– the most sought after commodity in case of an enemy threat – by suggesting that it could be bought 
at cheaper prices in Naples rather than Palermo;197 they were in a position to compare the prices of 
Flemish and Apulian cereals with those of Sicily and Naples,198 and to evaluate the convenience of 
shipping sulphur from Southern Sicily rather than importing it from Naples.199 Comparatively fresh 
knowledge on international markets permitted the Order to gauge the feasibility of importing excellent-
quality saltpetre from Flanders200 and wine from Calabria rather than Syracuse,201 taking into 
consideration delivery costs and time.  
 Through its information network, Hospitaller Malta’s reach in early modern European economy 
was apparently boundless, enabling Hospitaller administration to consider buying military ammunition 
from far-off centres like Warsaw,202 and opting to pay for thousands of cantara203 of gunpowder in 
France rather than Germany according to convenience and viability.204 It was a considerable advantage 
for the Order since, while having to manoeuvre within the constraints of a pre-industrial communication 
network, it allowed the Knights to consider economic and financial options on an international arena 
and to avoid, as much as possible, overdependence on one particular market or other. 
 Of course these economic and financial updates where nowhere more pertinent than for the 
export of Sicilian grain, the staple provision of pre-industrial Malta. The Order’s agents posted along 
Sicily’s littoral kept the Convent informed on harvest forecasts, effective agricultural yields, and grain 
prices on the island’s markets. Palermo exchanged information with Malta on the general situation and 
quality of Sicilian harvests, cereal price fluctuations, and supply levels in the wharves of Licata, Sciacca, 
and Girgenti.205 Frequent updates were also dispatched across the channel from Licata,206 at times on a 
daily basis,207 and briefings were also exchanged with Syracuse.208 First and foremost the Convent tried 
to predict agricultural yields in order to plan in advance its grain purchase strategy for the season in 
question. Harvest forecasts were based on weather contingencies.209 Rainfall levels were a fairly reliable 
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barometer to predict crop yield.210 Droughts and storms could be equally punishing on crops. Early 
modern Sicily was apparently a more arid place than it’s medieval equivalent and demographic swells 
increased the demand on agricultural yields.211 South-easterly winds – the dreaded scirocco – carried 
with them sands from North Africa, suffocating entire agricultural expanses212 both in Malta and Sicily. 
Whole harvests from fields of wheat, barley, and vines could go lost.213 When this happened, Hospitaller 
Malta knew that most probably it would have to pay more for its provisions or otherwise look elsewhere 
to stock its wharves.214 The Order, in consultation with the Common Treasury and the agents in Sicily, 
evaluated the various grain prices offered on the Sicilian market in conjunction with the effective and 
potential availability of grain in Malta and across the channel. In principal, and according to market 
logic, abundant harvests implied lower prices.215 If this was not so, the Order took its time to look 
around for a better bargain,216 perhaps discarding the option to buy from the old harvest and wait for 
the next, when prices could be more attractive.217 Grain prices could vary considerably over a short span 
of time on the same market and between one Sicilian market and another. During the same summer, 
grain prices in Palermo could go down from 64 tarì to 50 tarì per salma, while in Licata grain would 
be sold at 40 tarì per salma.218 On other occasions prices went down by just a few tarì219 or else they 
could decrease on a daily basis. In the summer of 1607, Licata informed the Order that grain prices 
were going down despite the fact that cylos were being emptied at a furious pace.220 In September of 
that year, in fact, grain in Syracuse was being sold at 10 tarì per salma, or less.221 Such low prices 
usually occurred when markets were flooded with cereals. Fertile seasons in Sicily had to be exploited 
to the full by Hospitaller Malta.222 
 All this constituted vital information for the Convent. Apart from allowing the Order to gauge 
the availability and potential sufficiency of Sicilian grain stocks, and consequently whether alternative 
grain markets had to be tapped,223 it could impinge on the timing, quantity, and routes of Hospitaller 
fund transfers from the continent to subsidize the purchases. If Malta was well stocked with grain, the 
Order could decide to take the chance and suspend purchases from Sicily in the hope that prices deflated 
later on in the season.224 If not, the island’s government had to act quickly to coordinate the transfer of 
sufficient funds to Sicily before grain prices started rising again by the end of summer when Sicilian 
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stocks would start dwindling.225 The overall result was that a portion of Hospitaller funds were 
consistently channelled to Sicily, mainly to Palermo226 and Messina, where they were either used 
directly to subsidize the grain purchases or transferred to places like Licata,227 from where cereals were 
bought to be shipped to Malta; or else funds would be directed to Syracuse228 or Trapani229 on opposite 
ends of the island for the baking of biscuit to be loaded on Hospitaller galleys.  Consequently, weather 
moods in the Mediterranean, the stock levels of grain wharves in Malta and Sicily, and overall market 
fluctuations conditioned the Order’s fund-transfer strategy.  Forecasts of a deficient Sicilian harvest 
could force the Order to speed up the collection of mortuaries and vacancies in Germany and remit the 
funds collected to Venice from where they would be transferred south.230 Alternatively, abundant 
harvests throughout Sicily as in 1610,231 coupled with shortages in the circulation of silver currency for 
which Sicily was notorious,232 could cause a dramatic decline in grain prices, creating a conjuncture too 
favourable for the Order not to exploit, by injecting its own currency from all over Europe in the Sicilian 
markets to buy grain.233 Systematic Hospitaller fund-transfer patterns thus came to be established to 
meet the subsistence needs of early modern Malta, with thousands of scudi of the Order’s credit being 
deposited in Palermo from Spain234 and Lyons,235 either directly or through Genoa and Naples.236 Funds 
could also reach Palermo or Messina from Germany via Venice,237 or from Lombardy via Genoa.238 
Naples, a grain market in its own terms and a banking centre from where to relocate Hospitaller funds,239 
was a conveniently close market to tap for alternative credit when time was pressing. Between 1599 
and 1628, a span of years covering the period under study, the Royal Mint of Naples minted 13 million 
ducats, coins which were immediately injected into circulation,240 rendering Naples one of the money 
markets less likely to end up insolvent in the Mediterranean. In September 1605, as soon as the Convent 
received news that wheat prices in Sicily had gone down, the receiver in Palermo was ordered to 
purchase wheat for 20,000 ducats remitted from the ricetta of Naples.241 In early 1618, when delays in 
Hospitaller remittances from Lombardy, Genoa, and Venice were compromising the baking of biscuit 
in Messina, the Common Treasury suggested that 3,000 ducats could be withdrawn from Naples to 
cover the commission.242 
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 The Convent’s cereal barometer which updated early modern Malta on the availability and 
prices of grain within the confines of the Hospitaller world, and Sicily in particular, had to be 
accompanied by a wider knowledge of the solvency situation and currency exchange-rates of Euro-
Mediterranean markets which somehow intersected the Order of St John’s communication and financial 
network. As explained earlier, the remittance of funds from Hospitaller financial centres to Sicily, 
Malta, or wherever the Order needed capital, was an operation which depended on a few basic 
conditions. First, the priories had to be solvent, meaning that enough responsions were to be collected 
to satisfy Hospitaller Malta’s needs. Like any institution which relied on financiers or money-lenders 
to transfer its funds, or which provided payment facilities at a distance, the Order was jealous of its 
creditworthiness. As it was to learn at its own tragic expense in the post revolutionary crisis of the 
1790s,243 defaulting on payments could spell ruin, a dreaded implication which Alof de Wignacourt 
seemed wary to avoid when drilling the simple equation to the receivership of Palermo in the summer 
of 1612 regarding the use of bills in either direction from Malta: 
we cannot send bills (bolle) if we are not sure that the transactions to be carried out through them can 
be paid for sure.244 
 Secondly, the European markets hosting the priories had to be solvent themselves in order to 
allow currency conversions required by the Order’s transactions. Currency exchange rates could also 
be determined by the degree of availability of bullion on a particular market. In 1609, the Order was 
worried that its receiver in Castile would have to pay hefty interests if compelled to fork out all 
payments in silver at a time when Spain was experiencing severe shortages of the metal.245 The Order 
was not always happy to effect payments in silver246 and cash transactions in Madrid occasionally could 
prove difficult to carry out, as denounced in 1618 by Brocchero, the Order’s ambassador in the Spanish 
Court.247 Shortages in currency on a certain piazza could shoot interests upwards in money-lending 
transactions, as happened to Philip II in 1561 when he contracted an asiento248 of 100,000 ducats on the 
Genoa exchange at the outrageous rate of 21.6 per cent.249 
 Thirdly, and similarly, the markets where the Order had to cash its funds to carry out payments 
had to have liquid currency available. In other words, the Hospitaller agents had to find financiers, 
merchants, or anyone with enough cash available to provide the Order with the sums required. This was 
a basic prerequisite to finalize remittances where the payments of goods were to be effected. Regional 
contingencies could swallow up capital to a degree that made it difficult for Hospitaller personnel to 
find solvent financiers, as in the case of the Messina fairs mentioned earlier. Consequently, the Order 
needed constant market information on multiple levels to be kept updated on what cash it could rely on, 
the exchange rates offered in Europe, which markets offered the best rates for the remittance of funds, 
and which markets were more solvent than others. As partly explained earlier, Hospitaller receivers and 
procurators were tasked to provide this information to the Convent and were allowed a degree of 
autonomy by the Order’s hierarchy when deciding which markets were best to deposit funds in. Apart 
from this, when demanded by circumstances, Hospitaller agents posted on the continent communicated 
with each other to coordinate the most feasible fund transfers possible.250 In 1615, Sollima in Messina 
and Ponte in Naples were advised to collaborate in finding the best way to transfer funds and reduce 
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the losses that the currency exchange and transfers on the Naples-Messina fund stream were incurring 
due to the silk fair being held in Messina.251 
 Receivers were allowed enough administrative leeway to decide whether to deposit sums in 
Naples, Messina, or Palermo in the summer months according to the most convenient interests rates 
which, to their knowledge, were on offer.252 This way they had funds available to buy cereals that same 
winter, or by the following spring in order to buy thousands of cantara of biscuit in Syracuse or Trapani, 
right in time to stock Hospitaller galleys when the sailing season started.253 Receivers and procurators 
had also the remit to negotiate currency exchange rates, although the last word was usually dictated 
from Malta on such matters. In early 1613, following the advice of the Common Treasury, the terms 
for a remittance to Messina negotiated by the receiver in Naples were overruled by the Convent, 
deeming the transaction unfavourable.254 Each receiver had a market zone of competence according to 
the Hospitaller financial jurisdiction he was posted in. The receivership of Palermo, for example, was 
consulted by the Order for its knowledge of Spanish markets,255 and could be asked to update Malta 
with the currency exchanges in Sicily,256 Lyons, Provence, Barcelona, and Castile.257 
 Thus, knowledge about the level of capital available on a piazza for bills to be cleared and 
payments to be effected had to be supplemented by information regarding the availability of Hospitaller 
responsions collected in the various priories. In June 1606, the German priories provided the Order with 
the most secure financial guarantees to remit capital in Sicily by October of that year to cover grain 
exports.258 The situation would change drastically with the onset of the Thirty Years War.259 If, as 
explained earlier, the Order did not have funds available in Castile, the transactions on the Castile-Sicily 
axis would stall or be postponed.260 The receiver in Palermo could brief the Convent regarding the 
larghezza di cambio, the availability of currency, in the Spanish and French markets, but the Order 
would not be able to exploit the favourable contingency unless it had enough money available on those 
markets, as apparently was the case in early 1607.261 This was a most unfortunate situation for the Order. 
A market flooded with currency was an opportunity not to be missed. The Genoese would take the 
trouble of dispatching express couriers from Madrid all the way to Antwerp simply to exploit favourable 
market conditions in Northern Europe.262 
 Financial interdependencies on a Euro-Mediterranean level conditioned Hospitaller monetary 
administration. The Order manipulated its fund-transfer strategy according to its needs, to its current 
financial condition, and to international market fluctuations. Knowledge of the possibility to effect 
favourable exchanges on Sicilian markets could induce the Order to commission daily remittances to 
Sicily from its receivers in Italy to exploit the profitable situation.263 If only a maximum of 6,000 libre 
in bills could be cleared in Saragossa (Aragon), cash availability in Palermo would be limited.264 
Information from Messina that coins were circulating more freely on the opposite end of Sicily could 
deflect Hospitaller remittances to the Palermo-Lyons axis.265 Similarly, knowledge that coins were 
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circulating in greater abundance in Naples rather than Palermo266 could encourage the Order to remit 
responsions in the centre of Campania. The Order’s hierarchy, in consultation with the Common 
Treasury,267 had to study the best options available to remit funds to Palermo or elsewhere if interest 
rates demanded on the Palermo exchange were exceptionally high, as claimed by the Order in July 
1606.268 Market contingencies conditioned Malta’s grain-purchasing strategy, forcing the Order to make 
adjustments in its fund-relocation policy. What appeared viable in spring could be impracticable by 
autumn. In the early months of 1617, the only way to transfer 40,000 scudi to Palermo appeared to be 
via Castile and Aragon,269 but by the end of September of that year the Order was encountering 
difficulties in transferring funds from Spain.270 However, funds could also be transferred in cash and 
the Order of St John chose to adopt this option whenever circumstances allowed it.  
The Transport of Hospitaller Bullion   
The transfer of money in cash became more problematic as western capitalism started maturing, trade 
volumes on an intercontinental level started increasing, and the government treasuries of modern 
monetary economies started becoming more demanding. The payment of the salaries of ever growing 
mercenary armies, just to mention an activity which could require hefty amounts of specie, solicited a 
flow of currency which the bills of exchange, those ‘privileged goods’271 which played such a distinctive 
role in the financial revolution of pre-industrial western society, were not always able to satisfy. The 
obvious problem with the transfer of cash was that it was reliant on man, animal, currents, and winds 
in quantities and forces more or less proportional to the amounts of bullion in ingots or coins relocated. 
A solitary courier could only carry gold coins in his garments to minimize the weight and make up sums 
of any significance worth transferring,272 with the inevitable risk of falling prey to rascals and bandits. 
When much larger amounts of cash, usually at institutional levels, had to be carried over long distances, 
the transport dynamics became more intricate and the incidence of geopolitics, financial feasibility, and 
climate increased. After the bourse of Antwerp was set up in 1531, Spanish silver was shipped north to 
Antwerp and Bruges in the zabras (vessels) of Biscay to pay the salaries of Habsburg mercenaries, a 
transport pattern which allowed Spain to avoid the troubles in French territory, but which started 
encountering severe difficulties after 1568 when English pirates started targeting this traffic, disrupting 
the plans of the Duke of Alva and inflicting a heavy blow to Spain’s Atlantic route.273  As an alternative, 
in the 1570s Philip II risked transporting bullion overland through France to finance Spanish warfare in 
the Netherlands, but this required heavy escort, recourse to diplomacy to obtain the French monarchy’s 
permission, and the agency of Genoese financiers.274 The Genoese shunned the land route from 
Cartagena to Barcelona in the second half of the sixteenth century, deeming it dangerous for the 
transport of their cash.275 The war with the ‘Turk’, which attracted more Spanish capital to the 
Mediterranean from the 1570s, and the greater influx of American silver in Seville from the 1580s, 
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invigorated the Barcelona-Genoa sea route for the transport of specie276 and it was only after the Peace 
of Westphalia in 1648 that the Spanish could transfer their bullion north in Dutch ships.277 
 The transport of Hospitaller bullion was, geographically speaking, a lopsided maritime affair, 
since it was mainly restricted to shipments in the western half of the Mediterranean. With the exception 
of Venice, all the principal ports through which the Order could ship its funds – mainly Barcelona, 
Marseilles, Genoa, Naples, Messina, and Palermo - were in the western Mediterranean. With a single 
galley trip in these waters, which occasionally could include stops in other harbours of the Spanish, 
French, and Italian littorals, the Order could end up collecting and shipping with relative safety to Sicily 
or Malta the responsions from its Iberian, French, Italian, and occasionally German priories when 
currency from the latter was deposited in Genoa and not Venice.278 The shipment of Hospitaller money 
from Amsterdam along the Atlantic described above was apparently highly exceptional and until further 
evidence is provided we cannot conclude that this traffic became a systematic pattern in Hospitaller 
bullion transfer as the seventeenth century progressed. Neither do the documents consulted for this 
study provide any indication that Hospitaller bullion from the European priories was shipped along the 
Adriatic from Venice, for example, notwithstanding the Republic’s pivotal role in the transfer south of 
the Order’s funds, as evidenced above. Deploying Hospitaller galleys solely to ship funds from Venice 
could be unfeasible, especially when risk factors were considered in the equation. In the Adriatic, the 
Order apparently could not count on a service similar to the one which occasionally could be provided 
by Genoese galleys when they carried Hospitaller capital south along the Tyrrhenian on their way to 
load Sicilian silk.279 Grand Master Nicholas Cotoner sustained that the Genoa-Messina sea route was 
travelled on a yearly basis by several vessels, providing a convenient maritime connection for whoever 
wanted to transfer goods or money south along the Tyrrhenian.280 
 The Ottoman threat could have continental and maritime implications for Hospitaller Malta, 
conditioning traffic related to the archipelago well beyond the islands’ shores. Shipments of 
commodities from Venice destined to the Convent could be delayed to avoid the risk of encountering 
Turkish fleets at the mouth of the Adriatic if Hospitaller intelligence suspected the concomitant 
possibility of enemy sorties west beyond Morea.281 The Order was ready to risk shipping these 
commodities from Venice, often in single unescorted Flemish vessels, presumably because this option 
was still more feasible than transferring merchandise overland through Italy, but it was apparently not 
prepared to take similar risks to transfer its bullion. Single merchant ships hired by the Venetian 
receivership could not provide the degree of security guaranteed by armed galleys and the Order could 
count on alternative fund transfer options from Venice anyway. The western Mediterranean was not 
exempt from similar Muslim menaces. The Tyrrhenian coast south of Rome was not renowned for safe 
shipping and Ottoman sorties could occasionally roam Calabrian waters,282 but the possibility of 
collecting several responsions in one trip and escorting them with multiple galleys rendered these 
ventures worthwhile for the Order. 
 As for the continental transfer of Hospitaller responsions, this study has no solid evidence that 
the Order’s currency was systematically transported overland in its journey towards Sicily, Malta, or 
elsewhere. It must be said that in the case of the fund remittances explained earlier, Hospitaller 
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documents do not always specify whether these were effected in bills of exchange or specie, or a 
combination of both. When discussing the transfer of Spanish capital through France in the 1570s, 
Braudel seems to suggest that we cannot conclude that money travelled in specie unless it is specifically 
stated in documents.283 In the case of the Hospitaller remittance mechanism for the relocation of funds 
from the European priories, it is highly unlikely that the Order was in a position to systematically 
transfer substantial sums overland in cash without some kind of escort, and the carriage costs would 
probably have been prohibitive. However, the overland transport of specie when responsions were 
collected to be deposited with the receiver of the respective priories – as in the case of High Germany 
described earlier - or by merchants at some stage of the remittance from Europe cannot be excluded. At 
one point the Order’s contemporary chronicler Dal Pozzo seems to imply that the Hospital’s Castilian 
responsions deposited in Madrid were carried overland to the Spanish Mediterranean coast, a journey 
between 150 and 200 miles long, where they had to be loaded on the Order’s galleys.284 A rare and 
explicit reference to the overland transport of Hospitaller cash is made in a letter dated September 1607, 
when the Order was planning the carriage of a sum from Licata to Palermo for the purchase of wheat 
on behalf of the Università.285 The wording of the correspondence, however, specifies that the transfer 
in question was to go through only under appropriate escort and the whole operation was to be carried 
out in great secrecy, presumably to limit the risk of ambush.286 The decision was left to the receiver of 
Palermo who apparently approved, for by the end of the following month a sum in cash was transferred 
along the Licata-Palermo land route.287 
 Notwithstanding the risks and costs involved, cash transfers afforded more than one advantage, 
all of which justify why an institution like the Order of St John occasionally chose to transport its own 
money in physical bulk at some stage during the relocation of its funds: they allowed a greater control 
on the overall transfer, making it possible to avoid territorial troubles, defy market fluctuations, and 
bypass piazzas where liquidity was poor and exchange rates unfavourable; and they reduced the number 
of remittance stages, cutting on transaction costs and consequently diminishing the dependence on 
money-lenders, merchants, and intermediaries, saving on commission charges. In 1605, the Order was 
considering alternative options to transfer its Spanish money from Barcelona, probably also in cash, 
since a previous transfer of 30,000 scudi from the Catalan exchange through a remittance mechanism 
had cost the Order an exorbitant 12 per cent interest.288 A typical bullion-collecting trip by Hospitaller 
galleys in the western half of the Mediterranean envisaged stops on the Spanish, French, and Italian 
littorals, to conclude the journey in one Sicilian port or more before crossing over to Malta.289 Galley 
trips of this scale were usually commissioned with multiple tasks. Logistics, the costs involved, the 
Order’s military schedule, and the seasons made it highly unlikely for the Order to plan galley trips 
solely to ship bullion,290 unless the distances involved were relatively short and the operation was 
financially worthwhile, as in 1612, when currency on the Sicilian market was easily available and 
money presumably cheap.291 On other occasions, the galleys would be sent on purpose from Malta to 
pick cash, normally from Palermo or Messina, especially if the sums involved were substantial.292 The 
Order’s documents talk of Hospitaller galleys returning from Messina with sacks full of scudi, at times 
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in their thousands,293 and in 1616 the Convent sent three galleys to Palermo to collect the grand sum of 
30,000 scudi.294 
 But the norm was to schedule longer trips with multiple commissions. Hospitaller galleys 
sailing in the western half of the Mediterranean would also stop in Genoa to take on board goods;295 
harbour in the Island of Elba to load a cargo of iron;296 and transport oarsmen from Naples.297 These 
trips were meticulously charted by the Order, for their stoppages had to be coordinated with the 
Hospitaller agents stationed in the respective ports where the galleys had to load bullion, merchandise, 
or otherwise.298 Whichever method was used to relocate responsions through Iberia, France, and Italy, 
prioral bullion intended to be shipped to Malta from the western half of the Mediterranean had to be 
made available in cash in ports like Cartagena, Alicante, Barcelona, Marseilles, Genoa, or Naples for 
example.299 An account of 1569 explains how Iberian funds were to make their way to Malta after being 
collected from Portugal, Castile and Leon, relocated to Aragon and deposited in Barcelona, from where 
they were to catch a shipping connection to Genoa, Naples, or Sicily to be presumably picked up by 
Hospitaller galleys.300 Fast forward a century, and we find three Hospitaller galleys in 1652 sailing north 
along Sicily’s eastern coast and the Tyrrhenian, drop mail addressed to Genoa at the Ligurian Riviera, 
and stop at Nice before sailing to Marseilles to load goods and bullion made available from the French 
priories. The departure from Marseilles was to be delayed to see if Maisenseuls, the Hospitaller receiver 
in Lyons, was in a position to provide the galleys with further cash before they coasted to Genoa to 
collect more funds made available in the Ligurian port and continue their trip south along the Tyrrhenian 
for a stopover in Campania to load more silver and gold obtained from the Knights’ spogli.301 
 Episodes a century apart such as these indicate a certain recurrence in the Order’s monetary 
administration, but sufficient similar documented instances exist in between to corroborate claims of 
fairly standard procedures regulating the transfer of Hospitaller bullion in the western half of the 
Mediterranean. A superficial look at the twenty years or so under study would reveal similar bullion-
collecting trips in 1605, 1606, 1607, 1610, 1613, 1616, and 1621.302 Occasionally this cash could stall 
in Sicily according to Hospitaller Malta’s needs, as in 1607 when thousands of scudi were shipped in 
great secrecy from Barcelona to Messina.303  Hospitaller cash could also travel between Sicilian markets 
to cover costs of purchases commissioned by the Convent, as when specie were shipped to Syracuse to 
finance the making of biscuit for the Order’s crews.304 
 If the Order’s money from cash shipments, remittances through bills of exchange, or the routine 
collection of responsions from the priories was not held in Sicily, southern Italy, or elsewhere, it was 
usually shipped to Malta either by the Hospitaller squadron during its trips in the western Mediterranean 
or by galleys sent on purpose from Malta to collect funds, as explained earlier. At times Hospitaller 
bullion, or credit in bills of exchange converted to money, was deposited in Naples, Palermo, or 
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Messina305 to exploit the return home of the Order’s galleys roaming the Mediterranean at the time to 
be subsequently shipped to Malta. This way Hospitaller galleys drifting along the coasts of Sicily, or 
returning from the western Mediterranean or from missions in the Levant, would load the Order’s funds 
previously deposited in physical bulk in Naples, Palermo, or Messina, or cashed in these ports through 
exchanges with markets like Barcelona, Lyons, Lombardy, Venice, Genoa, or Florence.306 It was very 
unlikely that substantial sums in cash were transported in vessels other than galleys unless for relatively 
short distances, such as channel crossings between Malta and Southern Italy for the transfer of the 
Università’s cash, the money of the ‘popolo’. This cash was usually shipped to Licata on the padroni’s 
frigates to pay for wheat from the wharves in Southern Sicily,307 although in October 1607, cash on the 
Malta-Licata route was carried in four galleys.308 But the use of galleys for the specific shipment of 
bullion along such short crossings seems to have been an exception. 
 Whatever logistics were involved however, the relocation of prioral funds tested Hospitaller 
Malta’s communication network to the full, for transfer operations, whether in physical bulk, through 
financial remittance mechanisms, or a combination of both, had to overcome the entire gamut of 
tyrannies which bridled pre-industrial man’s efforts when trying to sustain systematic connections 
through time and space. Distance, topography, the winds and the currents, bureaucracy, war, and 
epidemics, combined with the eternal frailties of human nature, all conspired to hinder, restrain, or slow 
down communication. The struggle to surmount barriers and maintain contacts knew no truce and 
Hospitaller Malta, lying precariously on the Habsburg-Ottoman divide, with a radius of continental 
interests ranging from Portugal to Bohemia, and harassed by Mediterranean perils emanating from 
North Africa and the Levant, had to grapple consistently with similar contingencies to defy isolation 
and survive. 
Conclusion 
Early modern Malta’s convenience to Habsburg Spain stemmed also from the Order of St John’s 
continental estates and assets, which systematically provided alternatives, both in terms of market 
access and communication options, despite the inherent weakness in their scattered nature which 
rendered them vulnerable to the continent’s vicissitudes. These resources, together with other sources 
of income, afforded Hospitaller Malta a degree of independence when managing military conflicts, 
allowing it to participate in the overall financial burden incurred by the struggle against Islam in the 
Mediterranean, together with Spain, the Papacy, Venice, and other potentates.309  
Through Hospitaller prioral funds, Malta’s bellicose contribution to the active defence in the 
central Mediterranean was also a financial one and helped to ease Habsburg Spain’s general costs of 
warfare. Apart from allowing  a degree of self-sufficiency in military campaigns, Hospitaller estates 
and funds rendered Malta of early modernity unique when compared to other Catholic Mediterranean 
islands. No other island in the Mediterranean could boast of such a ramified financial network in 
Europe, for no other island had a government possessing such a widespread mass of continental property 
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whose main aim was to generate capital and relocate substantial parts of it for the exclusive benefit of 
the island-headquarters. 
Decades of reform and stabilisation within Hospitaller Malta’s establishment moulded an 
administrative structure capable of devising and implementing a market strategy and of relocating funds 
across hundreds of kilometres through elaborate financial mechanisms. Market intelligence regarding 
all sorts of products and the degree of liquidity of certain European financial centres made it to Malta 
through Mediterranean ports, which provided access to the Order’s priories, consequently increasing 
Malta’s continental reach and enabling the Hospitaller establishment to make informed decisions 
regarding the quality and convenience of its purchases, and the relocation and exploitation of its funds. 
In consequence, bullion generated in Hospitaller priories was injected into the island’s economy after 
being relocated via international financial centres through credit mechanisms and cash transfer, and the 
archipelago was supplied with provisions and commodities purchased from markets within the orbit of 
Malta’s shipping routes.  
The financial transactions consequent to this network introduced Malta to what Braudel labels 
as the ‘reasonable’ world of paper money and bills of exchange and to a future which was still denied 
to mammoth islands like Corsica and Sardinia, whose largely barter-based and ‘half-enclosed’ 
economies were substantially still alien to a financial revolution which was providing the West with an 
extra economic dimension.310 Early modern Malta became the southernmost economy in Christianity 
where the use of the bill of exchange – hitherto hardly known to whole chunks of the planet - became 
the norm at an institutional level. Apart from a military frontier, Malta also became a Mediterranean 
financial frontier with economic links reaching up to Amsterdam311 in a phase when Dutch capitalism 
was replacing Mediterranean capitalism,312 hooking the island to a fledgling western capitalist economy. 
How, at which point, and to what extent the Maltese and their financial activities systematically 
followed suit in this new financial dimension is a different story, one which cannot be dealt with here.  
The arrival of the Knights marked an economic and financial watershed for Malta. Following 
their settlement in 1530, Hospitaller bullion and bills of exchange started to be used at an institutional 
level to import all sorts of goods to Malta, integrating the island into a western monetary economy and 
endowing it with an economic edge not only at a regional level vis-à-vis other Mediterranean islands 
with far greater indigenous resources, but possibly anticipating similar processes in other European 
nations. It took the reforming efforts of Gustavus Adolphus and the intervention of foreign 
entrepreneurship to pull a northern power like Sweden out of its barter phase from the second decade 
of the 1600s, introducing it to a mercantile economy centred around Amsterdam.313 
 Through the Order’s financial transactions, the island’s international dimension experienced an 
unprecedented growth, starting with the increment of the island’s incidence at a regional level, not only 
on an active and preventive military level, but also on an economic one. Through the Order of St John’s 
affairs, the island could surprisingly influence nearby markets. Just as the arrival in Seville of Spain’s 
Atlantic fleet could inflate commodity prices in Spain,314 the arrival of Hospitaller bullion in Sicily 
could have the same effect on Sicilian cereal prices, albeit on much more modest proportions.315 
Through Hospitaller networking on a Mediterranean and continental level, Malta was becoming 
something much more than a Spanish fief and mere satellite of Sicily. It was being transformed into an 
island with the adornments of a state. 
 
                                                     
310 Braudel (1986), 382-3; 509-10. 
311 For an example of Hospitaller Malta’s financial and commercial links to Amsterdam in the seventeenth century, 
see Grech (2016), chapter 7. 
312 Braudel (1986), 510.  
313 Kennedy, 81-5. 
314 For the effect on the European price revolution of the transfer to Spain of American silver in early modernity, 
see Braudel, (1986), 476-542. 
315 AOM 1393, Wignacourt to Valdina (Palermo), ff. 75-76r, 31 January 1614.  
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Abbreviations 
  
AOM - Archives of the Order, Malta  
f - folio  
r - recto  
v - verso  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
